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ABSTRACT
For decades, economists and social thinkers have debated the influence of population change on economic
growth.  Three alternative positions define this debate:  that population growth restricts, promotes, or is
independent of economic growth.  Proponents of each explanation can find evidence to support their cases.  All
of these explanations, however, focus on population size and growth.  In recent years, however, the debate has
under-emphasized a critical issue, the age structure of the population (that is, the way in which the population is
distributed across different age groups), which can change dramatically as the population grows. Because people￿s
economic behavior varies at different stages of life, changes in a country￿s age structure can have significant effects
on its economic performance.  Nations with a high proportion of children are likely to devote a high proportion
of resources to their care, which tends to depress the pace of economic growth.  By contrast, if most of a nation￿s
population falls within the working ages, the added productivity of this group can produce a "demographic
dividend" of economic growth, assuming that policies to take advantage of this are in place.  In fact, the combined
effect of this large working-age population and health, family, labor, financial, and human capital policies can
create virtuous cycles of wealth creation.  And if a large proportion of a nation￿s population consists of the elderly,
the effects can be similar to those of a very young population.  A large share of resources is needed by a relatively
less productive segment of the population, which likewise can inhibit economic growth. After tracing the history
of theories of the effects of population growth, this report reviews evidence on the relevance of changes in age
structure for economic growth.  It also examines the relationship between population change and economic
development in particular regions of the world: East Asia; Japan; OECD, North America and Western Europe;
South-central and Southeast Asia; Latin America; Middle East and North Africa; Sub-Saharan Africa; and Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union.  Finally, it discusses the key policy variables that, combined with reduced
fertility and increases in the working-age population, have contributed to economic growth in some areas of the
developing world.
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Summary 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:  THE IMPORTANCE OF AGE 
STRUCTURE 
For decades, economists and social thinkers have debated the influence of population 
change on economic growth.
5  Three alternative positions define this debate:  that 
population growth restricts, promotes, or is independent of economic growth.  Proponents 
of each explanation can find evidence to support their cases.
6  All of these explanations, 
however, focus on population size and growth.  In recent years, however, the debate has 
under-emphasized a critical issue, the age structure of the population (that is, the way in 
which the population is distributed across different age groups), which can change 
dramatically as the population grows.
7  
Because people￿s economic behavior varies at different stages of life, changes in a 
country￿s age structure can have significant effects on its economic performance.  Nations 
with a high proportion of children are likely to devote a  high proportion of resources to 
their care, which tends to depress the pace of economic growth.  By contrast, if most of a 
nation￿s population falls within the working ages, the added productivity of this group can 
produce a "demographic dividend" of economic growth, assuming that policies to take 
advantage of this are in place.  In fact, the combined effect of this large working-age 
population and health, family, labor, financial, and human capital policies can create 
virtuous cycles of wealth creation.  And if a large proportion of a nation￿s population 
                                                           
5 A recent and very important summary of the history, along with a set of well-focused essays on the 
subjects treated in this essay is Birdsall, Nancy, Allen C. Kelley, and Steven W. Sinding, eds., Population 
Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth, and Poverty in the Developing World. Oxford University 
Press, 2001. 
6 The issue is further complicated because some research has shown that the relationship is different in 
developing countries than in developed countries. See Allen Kelley, 2001, "The Population Debate in 
Historical Perspective: Revisionism Revised," p. 46. In Birdsall, N., Kelley, A., and Sinding, S. eds. Population 
Matters: Demography, Growth, and Poverty in the Developing World. pp. 24-54. Oxford University Press. 
7 In fact, considerations of age structure were not entirely absent from these debates. Most notably, the 
seminal work by Coale and Hoover (1958) suggested that population growth impeded economic growth 
partly because it goes hand in hand with increased youth dependency.    3
consists of the elderly, the effects can be similar to those of a very young population.  A 
large share of resources is needed by a relatively less productive segment of the 
population, which likewise can inhibit economic growth. 
After tracing the history of theories of the effects of population growth, this report reviews 
evidence on the relevance of changes in age structure for economic growth.  It also 
examines the relationship between population change and economic development in 
particular regions of the world: East Asia; Japan; OECD, North America and Western 
Europe; South-central and Southeast Asia; Latin America; Middle East and North Africa; 
Sub-Saharan Africa; and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  Finally, it discusses 
the key policy variables that, combined with reduced fertility and increases in the working-
age population, have contributed to economic growth in some areas of the developing 
world.
8 
THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC ￿DIVIDEND￿ 
The relationship between population change and economic growth has taken on added 
salience in recent years because of demographic trends in the developing world. At 
varying rates and times since the Second World War, developing countries have been 
undergoing a demographic transition, from high to low rates of mortality and fertility.  
This transition is producing a "boom" generation ￿ a generation that is larger than those 
immediately before and after it ￿ that is gradually working its way through nations￿ age 
structures.  The East Asian nations were at the forefront of this transition; other regions, 
including Latin America, began their transitions later, in the 1960s and ￿70s.  Yet other 
areas ￿ notably some countries in the Middle East and Africa ￿ have not yet fully begun, 
or are in the early phases of this transition.   
                                                           
8 The text, tables, and figures for this paper draw heavily on United Nations, World Population Prospects: 
The 2000 Revision. Unless otherwise noted, we use the UN’s "medium variant" for all data. The UN’s 
methodology has been criticized for its reliance on the assumption that all countries will converge to a 
fertility rate of 2.1 children per woman. The concern here is that this suggests fertility will rise in quite a few 
countries where the total fertility rate is currently below the replacement level of 2.1. Regardless of the 
merits of this critique, we note that most of the results presented in this paper are qualitatively insensitive 
to the difference between the "medium" and "low-fertility" variants of the data.    4
THE ESSENTIAL POLICY ENVIRONMENT 
Nations undergoing this transition have an opportunity to capitalize on the ￿demographic 
dividend￿ offered by the maturing of formerly young populations.  The demographic 
dividend is not, however, automatic.  Given the right kind of policy environment, this 
demographic dividend can help to produce a sustained period of economic growth, as it 
did in several East Asian economies.  The critical policy areas include 
•  Public health 
•  Family planning 
•  Education 
•  Economic policies that promote labor-market flexibility, openness to trade, and 
savings.  
Policymakers in developing countries have a window of opportunity for exploiting the 
maturation of previously young populations.  Policymakers should consider how to 
maximize and capture this dividend by accelerating the demographic transition, and 
allowing extra labor to be absorbed productively in the market.  Finally, policymakers 
must plan for the future health care and pension income needs of this baby boom 
generation when it ages.  The demographic transition offers policymakers a window of 
opportunity.  Seizing it could prove vital to the economic and social development of their 
countries.  
Before proceeding, note that policies that enhance the free operation of markets are 
frequently referred to, below. In most simple economic models, such policies will tend to 
promote a country’s ability to take advantage of the demographic dividend. However, two 
caveats are in order.   
First, policy reforms that make labor markets more flexible are not unambiguously 
beneficial, especially in the short run. Political feasibility can also be an issue. Workers   5
who suffer pay reductions, who are displaced, or who fear these outcomes can be a 
potent political force resisting change. In principle, social protection programs can ease 
the impact of labor market reforms, but there are few successful models to which one can 
point (see, for example, Lustig (2001)). Nevertheless, capture of the potential 
demographic dividend can be impeded by labor market rigidities that pervade many 
developing countries. These include rules governing the hiring and firing of individuals 
that prevent employers from taking risks and thus deter investment; minimum wages that 
exceed market rates and thereby discourage hiring and training; government pay 
practices that are grossly out of line with the market; and labor market inertia caused by 
labor-management bargaining.  
Second, similar issues arise with respect to free trade, since it is well established that 
trade liberalization creates both winners and losers. Openness to trade can provoke 
economic adjustments that lead to unemployment and poverty. There are also some 
important issues about the fundamental fairness of outcomes that result when countries 
become more integrated into the world economy. These questions relate, for example, to 
intellectual property rights, immigration restrictions, and developed country protectionism.  
Devising economically and politically realistic programs to deal with these challenges is 
hugely important, though beyond the scope of this report.    6
 
Chapter 1  The Debate over the Effects of Population Change on 
Economic Growth 
The relationship between population change and economic growth remains a subject of 
debate among economists and demographers.  They continue to disagree about whether 
population change is (a) restricts, (b) promotes, or (c) is independent of economic 
growth.  Proponents of each view can point to research evidence to support their cases.   
The utility of this debate has been hampered by one shortcoming:  its almost exclusive 
focus on population size and growth.  Little attention has been paid to a critical variable, 
the age structure of the population (that is, the way in which the population is distributed 
across different age groups) and how it changes when populations grow.  
This report attempts to address this limitation.  It reviews the debate over the effects of 
demographic change on economic growth and examines the evidence on the relevance of 
changes in age structure for economic growth.  It also examines the relationship between 
population change and economic development in particular regions of the world. Finally, it 
discusses key policies that, combined with reduced fertility and increases in the working-
age population, have contributed to economic growth in the developing world.     
Understanding the relationship between population change and economic growth has 
taken on immense significance in recent years because of demographic trends in the 
developing world.  The world￿s developing countries ￿ home to the vast majority of the 
world￿s population ￿ are in varying stages of a demographic transition from high to low 
rates of mortality and fertility.  This transition is producing a boom generation that is 
gradually working its way through nations￿ age structures.  In conjunction with the right 
kinds of policies, this phenomenon creates opportunities for economic growth in 
developing countries.  For this reason, policymakers should benefit from a clearer 
understanding of the relationship between economic development and the shifting age 
structure that results from the unfolding demographic transition.   7
THE ￿PESSIMISTIC￿ THEORY:  POPULATION GROWTH RESTRICTS ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
Following the Second World War, rapid population growth, resulting from the gap 
between declining mortality and continuing high fertility, began occurring in much of Asia.  
By the mid-1960s, more countries, including a number in Latin America and the Middle 
East, were experiencing unprecedented rates of population growth. At such rates, their 
populations would double in less than 25 years. 
9  
Concerns about rapid population growth voiced by demographers, social scientists, and 
others were based largely on the assumption that such growth would ￿serve as a brake￿ 
on economic development.
10   In the late 1940s, conservationists began to write about 
excessive population growth being a threat to food supplies and natural resources.  
Concerns about the impact of rapid population growth and high fertility underlay the 
widespread implementation of family planning programs in many areas of the developing 
world (see Seltzer, RAND, forthcoming 2001).  Policymakers presumed that by helping to 
reduce high fertility, family planning programs would slow population growth, which in 
turn would contribute to improved economic performance by freeing resources that 
otherwise would be devoted to child-rearing as well as reducing strains on infrastructure 
and the environment. 
The ￿pessimistic￿ theory traces its lineage to Thomas Malthus.  Writing in the 1790s, 
Malthus asked whether ￿the future improvement of society￿ was possible in the face of 
ever larger populations. He reached his famously dismal conclusion: 
 ￿Taking the population of the world at any number, a thousand millions, for instance...the 
human species would increase in the ratio of 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128, 256, 516, etc. and 
subsistence as 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8,  9, 10, etc.  In two centuries and a quarter the 
                                                           
9 Some of these countries, in fact, more than doubled their population between 1965 and 1990, while some 
of them saw their growth rate slow down. 
10 For a discussion of trends in global population growth since the 1950s and the implications of high fertility 
for economic growth, see Bulatao, 1998, pp. 3-20.   8
population would be to the means of subsistence as 512 to 10; in three centuries as 4096 
to 13, and in two thousand years the difference would be incalculable.￿
11  
 
In a world with fixed resources for growing food, and slow technical progress, Malthus 
theorized, food production would quickly be swamped by the pressures of a rapidly 
growing population. The available diet would then fall below subsistence level, until 
population growth was halted by a high death rate. Living standards could only ever 
improve in the short term ￿ before they set in motion more rapid population growth. The 
balance between population and income growth was the ￿great law of our nature.￿  
Accordingly, ￿No fancied equality, no agrarian regulations in their utmost extent, could 
remove the pressure of it even for a single century. And it appears, therefore, to be 
decisive against the possible existence of a society, all the members of which should live 
in ease, happiness, and comparative leisure; and feel no anxiety about providing the 
means of subsistence for themselves and families.￿
12 
Malthus￿s pessimism remains with us.  In 1968, for instance, Paul Ehrlich opened his 
influential book "The Population Bomb" with the words, "The battle...is over. In the 1970s 
hundreds of millions of people are going to starve to death."
13  More measured studies 
undertaken by the US National Academy of Sciences (NAS) in 1971 and the United 
Nations in 1973 also predicted that the net effect of population growth would be 
negative.
14 Rapid population growth continues to press on the modern consciousness.  
The world￿s population has grown sixfold since 1800, when it stood at about one billion.  
It took less than 130 years to add another billion. Things have quickened considerably 
since.  The 6 billionth baby was born in October 1999 ￿ and world population is forecast 
to be 9.3 billion people by the year 2050 (see Table 1). Table 2 shows the current 
                                                           
11 Malthus, T. R. (1798). Essay on the Principle of Population, As It Affects the Future Improvement of 
Society with Remarks on the Speculation of Mr. Godwin, M. Condorcet, and Other Writers, Penguin Classics 
ed. (Harmondsworth, 1982). 
12 Ibid. 
13 Ehrlich, P. 1968. The Population Bomb. New York: Ballantine 
14 National Academy of Sciences (1971): Rapid population growth: consequences and policy implications. 2 
volumes. Baltimore: John Hopkins Press for the National Academy of Sciences; United Nations (1973): The 
determinants and consequences of population trends. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Population studies N0 50. 2 volumes. New York: United Nations.   9
population of all regions and countries, along with the share of the world’s total 
population in each region. With the population of many developed countries decreasing by 
2050, all of this explosive population growth is happening in developing countries
15 (see 
Figure 1) ￿ most rapidly in those geographic regions that are most fragile and least 
hospitable (due to adverse climate, lack of resources, or unfavorable location) to 
economic growth
16 ￿ encouraging predictions of demographic catastrophe. 
For a time, it seemed the pessimists had the right answer. Innovations in agriculture, such 
as irrigation in China and potato cultivation in Ireland, were accompanied by vast 
increases in population that hampered improvements in living standards.  Until 1700, 
income gaps between countries were fairly small and, even in 1820, real income levels in 
the advanced European nations were only about two to three times those found in Africa, 
Asia, and Latin America (see Figure 2). 
In addition to the effect of population numbers on the demand for fixed resources, there 
is also a potentially negative impact of population growth on capital intensity.  In 
principle, higher population numbers require more homes, factories and infrastructure to 
house, employ and provide for their needs.  In the long run such capital can be 
constructed, but periods of rapid population growth may well lead to reductions in capital 
per worker and lower living standards. When population growth is rapid, a large part of 
investment is used to supply the needs of the growing population rather than enabling an 
increase in the level of provision per capita.   
Both these theories give grounds for pessimism.  However, by the early 1980s economists 
were beginning to reject the pessimist view. Empirical research had weakened the 
pessimists￿ case; economic theory had begun to give increasing importance to technology 
and human capital accumulation compared to the old key growth factors of physical 
capital; and demographic theory started to look to the intermediate and long term, where 
the short-term effects of population growth were likely to have at least partly smoothed 
                                                           
15 UN Population Division: World Population Prospects ￿ The 2000 Revision. 28 February 2001: 6   10
out.
17 In response to these developments, organizations like the National Academy of 
Sciences began to revise their earlier views, as economists, with their greater faith in 
markets￿ ability to respond to population growth, gained prominence over the social and 
biological scientists who previously dominated population thinking.
18 
THE ￿OPTIMISTIC￿ THEORY: POPULATION CHANGE CAN FUEL ECONOMIC 
GROWTH 
Recent history has cast further doubt on the pessimists￿ theory.  In the last 30 years ￿ 
when the world￿s population has doubled ￿ per capita incomes have increased by about 
two thirds.  Famines have occurred, but Ehrlich￿s ￿hundreds of millions￿ of people have 
not starved; the famines that have occurred were largely caused by poverty and lack of 
funds among a section of the population to buy food rather than any absolute shortage of 
food  (as Amartya Sen has noted, there has never been a famine in a functioning 
democracy, whatever its population growth rate
19). Technological progress, in both 
agriculture and industry, has been more rapid than any other time in human history.  
There have been equally dramatic social and institutional innovations, in the way people 
work, the standard of their education and health and the extent to which they participate 
in the political process
20.  Rather than being constrained by fixed resources, the prices of 
many raw materials are in long-term decline, and some parts of the economy are 
becoming ￿dematerialized￿ as knowledge becomes an increasingly vital asset.
21 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
16 Jeffrey D Sachs, Andrew D Mellinger and John L Gallup: The Geography of Poverty and Wealth. Scientific 
American March 2001 
17 On the importance of human capital in explaining differences in standards of living across countries, see 
Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).  On demographics, see Allen C Kelley (2001): The population debate in 
historical perspective: revisionism revisited. In Population Matters: Demography, Growth, and Poverty in the 
Developing World, Nancy Birdsall, Allen C. Kelley and Steven Sinding, editors, Oxford University Press, 2001.  
18 National Research Council (1986): Population growth and economic development: policy questions. 
Washington, DC: National Academy Press, cited in Kelley (2001): ibid 
19 Amartya Sen (1999): Developpment as Freedom. Oxford University Press. 
20 Amartya Sen: Development as Freedom. Knopf 1999; Bloom, David E., Patricia H. Craig and Pia N. 
Malaney, 2001, The Quality of Life in Rural Asia. Oxford University Press. 
21 World Bank: World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World. OUP 1997; Task Force on 
Higher Education and Society: Higher Education in Developing Countries: Peril and Promise. World Bank 
February 2000   11
These trends have supported the views of a group of ￿population optimists￿ who have 
sought to promote the idea that population growth can be an economic asset.  Simon 
Kuznets and Julian Simon, for example, argue (separately) that as populations increase, 
so does the stock of human ingenuity.  Larger societies ￿ with the capacity to take 
advantage of economies of scale ￿ are better positioned to develop, exploit, and 
disseminate the increased flow of knowledge they receive.
22  Simon, in his influential book 
"The Ultimate Resource", showed how positive feedbacks ￿ such as the tendency of 
natural resource prices to decline in the long-term due to technological progress induced 
by the growing demands of rising populations ￿ can mean that rapid population growth 
can lead to positive impacts on economic development.
23 Ester Boserup uses similar 
arguments to turn the Malthusian world-view around.  Population growth creates pressure 
on resources. People are resourceful and are stimulated to innovate, especially in 
adversity.  When rising populations swamped traditional hunter-gatherer arrangements, 
slash-burn-cultivate agriculture emerged. When that, too, became inadequate, intensive 
multi-annual cropping was developed.
24  More recently the Green Revolution, which has 
almost quadrupled world food production since 1950 using just 1 percent more land, was 
a direct reaction to population pressure.  ￿Without high yield agriculture,￿ comments 
Norman Borlaug, an initiator of the Green Revolution, ￿either millions would have starved 
or increases in food output would have been realized through losses of pristine land a 
hundred times greater than all losses to urban and suburban expansion.￿
25 
The Optimists, while refuting the alarmist tendencies of the Pessimists￿ theory, were not 
dogmatic about the positive impacts of population growth. Instead, they took a broader 
view, suggesting that a multiplicity of external factors were responsible for the 
consequences of population growth. These factors could have either positive or negative 
                                                           
22 Kuznets, S. 1960. Population Change and Aggregate Output. In Universities--National Bureau Committee 
for Economic Research, Demographic and Economic Change in Developed Countries. Princeton:  Princeton 
University  Press.; Kuznets, S. 1967. ￿Population and economic growth￿, Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society 111, 170￿93. 
23 Simon, Julian L (1981): The Ultimate Resource. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
24 Boserup, E. 1965. The Conditions of Agricultural Progress. London: Allen and Unwin; Boserup, E. 1981. 
Population and Technological Change: A Study of Long-Term Trends. Chicago:  University of Chicago Press. 
25 uk@earth.people, Department for International Development, United Kingdom, 1997.    12
economic consequences ￿ as TN Srinivasan said: ￿many of the alleged deleterious 
consequences result more from inappropriate policies and institutions than from rapid 
population growth.￿
26 This broadening of the discussion on population growth eventually 
led to population neutralism emerging as the dominant view in the demographic debate.
27  
 
THE ￿NEUTRALIST￿ THEORY:  POPULATION CHANGE HAS NO SIGNIFICANT 
EFFECT ON ECONOMIC GROWTH 
In his great "Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations" (1776), Adam 
Smith asked why some countries were richer than others.  He found his answer in the 
division of labor, which allowed workers to become more productive by honing their skills 
at ever more specialized tasks. In recent years, economists considering the economic 
effects of demographic change have been more interested in Adam Smith, and his 
narrative of the power of the market, than in Thomas Malthus￿s dire predictions about 
population.  Most economic analysis has examined the statistical correlation between 
population and economic growth and found little significant connection.  Though countries 
with rapidly growing populations tend to have more slowly growing economies (see Figure 
3), this negative correlation typically disappears (or even reverses direction) once other 
factors such as country size, openness to trade
28, educational attainment of the 
population, and the quality of civil and political institutions are taken into account (see 
Figure 4). In other words, when controlling for other factors, there is little cross-country 
evidence that population growth impedes economic growth.
29  This result seems to justify 
a third view, population neutralism.  
                                                           
26 TN Srinivasan (1988): Population growth and economic development. Journal of Policy Modeling. Spring, 
10 (1), pp 7-28. 
27 A more recent position is that of Galor and Weil (1999) who propose that the Malthusian and growth regimes should 
not be seen as competitors but rather, respectively, the beginning and end of a historical process.  The world begins in 
the Malthusian regime and eventually evolves from an intermediate stage they call Post-Malthusian, into the current 
Modern Growth Regime.   
28 Sachs and Warner (1995) judge openness to trade on the basis of tariffs, quotas and licensing, black market premia, 
and export taxes. 
29 This result, however, refers to the average experience across countries. The economic performance of any 
specific country, however, will be determined by many forces.    13
The neutralist theory is the dominant view today. Although there are some variations 
within the neutralist school, with the NAS concluding in 1986 that, ￿on balance￿slower 
population growth would be beneficial to economic development of most developing 
countries￿
30 (our italics), and the World Bank suggesting that in some countries bigger 
populations can boost economic growth, the overall tendency is to accord  population 
issues a relatively minor place in the context of the wider policy environment.  
Allen Kelley has suggested that population neutralism has in fact been the predominant 
school in thinking among academics about population growth for the last half-century; for 
example,  the academic background papers to even the most pessimistic UN and NAS 
reports are much more moderate in tone than the reports themselves.
31 Kelley cites three 
major research areas that influenced the rise of population neutralism in the 1980s: 
-  Natural resources: Exhaustion of natural resources was found not to be as strongly 
affected by population growth as the Pessimists thought. Technology, conservation, 
and efficient market allocation of resources all play a part in preserving natural 
resources, and per capita income has been shown to be a key determinant of 
supply and demand for these resources. 
-  Saving: The impact on economic growth of reduced saving as a result of population 
growth is not borne out by studies. 
-  Diversification of resources: Where the Pessimists had thought that population 
growth would lead to a diversion of resources from productive physical capital 
formation to less economically productive areas such as education and social 
welfare programs, multi-country studies showed that this did not in fact happen to 
any great extent. 
According to Kelley, these studies, coupled with the impact of Julian Simon￿s "The 
Ultimate Resource" on extending demographers￿ view into the longer term, were crucial in 
                                                           
30 National Research Council (1986): ibid 
31 Kelley (2001): ibid   14
bringing neutralism to the fore, and the theory has since had an enormous influence on 
policymakers in developing countries and on the international development community.  
The Reagan Administration and several donor agencies sought to limit lending to 
population programs and simultaneously appealed to neutralist theory.
32  
THE IMPORTANCE OF AGE STRUCTURE 
Proponents of population pessimism, optimism, and neutralism can all fall back on 
theoretical models and more or less robust data to back up their positions. But, as 
discussed below, the policy environment and the influence of markets and institutions are 
at least as important as the population growth rate itself in determining whether countries 
with expanding populations suffer or thrive.  
All of these theories, however, tend to ignore a critical dimension of population dynamics:  
populations￿ evolving age structure.  Economists have tended to focus on population 
growth, ignoring the changing age distribution within populations as they grow.
33  Yet 
these changes are arguably as important as population growth.  Each age group in a 
population behaves differently, with distinct economic consequences:  the young require 
intensive investment in health and education, prime-age adults supply labor and savings, 
and the aged require health care and retirement income (Figure 5 is a schematic 
representation of life cycle income and consumption).  When the relative size of each of 
these groups in a population changes, so does the relative intensity of these economic 
behaviors.  (Figure 6 illustrates the period of high population growth preceding the period 
during which there is a high share of working-age people.) This matters significantly to a 
                                                           
32 World Bank economists for a long time thought that the macroeconomic case for population lending was 
weak (Steven W Sinding, Professor of Clinical Public Health, Columbia University, personal communications), 
and excluded population issues from most policy discussions (Tom Merrick, Senior Population and 
Reproductive Health Adviser, World Bank, personal communications). The Reagan Administration￿s Mexico 
City statement in 1984 stated that, ￿population is neither a positive nor a negative factor￿ in development, 
but is neutral. This statement was associated with the new policy of denying federal funding to NGOs that 
performed or promoted abortion as a means of family planning in other nations. This policy, which had been 
overturned by President Clinton in 1993, was reinstated by the Bush Administration in January 2001. 
33 The exception was the seminal Coale-Hoover study, which used India and Mexico as case studies to 
emphasize the costs associated with a high dependency ratio in the early stage of the demographic 
transition. See Coale, A. and Hoover, E.  1958. Population Growth and Economic Development in Low 
Income Countries. Princeton:  Princeton University Press.   15
country￿s income growth prospects.  Policymakers with a broad view of development and 
the complex relation between economic and human development must factor these 
effects of changing age structure into decisions about their countries￿ future.  
This challenge is especially pressing in the developing world. In those countries whose 
mortality and fertility rates are beginning to fall (South-central Asia and much of Sub-
Saharan Africa, for example), there is an opportunity for governments to capitalize on the 
consequent demographic transition, where the number of working-age adults grows large 
relative to the dependent population and potentially acts as a major economic spur. 
Conversely, if the appropriate policy environment is not in place, unemployment and 
instability may result, and health, education and social welfare systems may come under 
unbearable strain. Those developing countries whose transition is advanced, on the other 
hand (Southeast Asia and Latin America), need to look to the future, putting in place 
policies to cope with an aging population and make the most of the remaining years of 
low dependency ratios. The next section will go on to assess how countries can make the 
most of the age structure of their populations. 
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Chapter 2  Demographic Transitions and the ￿Demographic 
Dividend￿ 
This chapter examines the ￿demographic transition￿ that all countries experience as 
economic development progresses, discusses the mechanisms by which its impacts are 
felt, and highlights the opportunity for economic growth ￿ the ￿demographic dividend￿ ￿ 
that this transition offers to developing nations.   
THE DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION:  DECLINING MORTALITY AND FERTILITY 
In much of the developing world, a ￿demographic transition￿ transition is under way, 
accelerating with the declines in mortality that began around the end of the Second World 
War.  Improvements in medicine and public health, including the introduction of 
antibiotics such as penicillin, treatments for diseases such as tuberculosis and diarrhea, 
and the use of DDT, which helps control malaria, have contained or eradicated diseases 
that once killed millions of people.
34  This was accompanied by improved sanitation, 
nutrition, and the wider practice of healthier behaviors.  All this gradually led to higher life 
expectancies, by as much as twenty years in some countries, and naturally to population 
growth (see Figures 7 and 8).  Yet despite higher life expectancies, these countries had 
populations that were, on average, growing younger.
35 This is because mortality declines 
were not evenly distributed across the population.  Infectious diseases are particularly 
ruthless killers of the young, so their containment had the most powerful impact on the 
mortality of infants and children which fell earlier and more quickly than mortality at other 
ages (Figure 9 shows the decline in infant mortality rates over time).  The larger surviving 
youth cohorts served to drive down the average age of populations.   
                                                           
34 See Bloom, River Path Associates, and Fang, 2000, ￿Social Technology and Human Health,￿ Background 
paper prepared for Human Development Report 2001.   
35 From 1950 to 1960, the median age decreased in all regions and subregions of Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America. This time period captures the early stages of the demographic transition in most of the developing 
world. See United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision.   17
The mortality decline which began the demographic transition has been succeeded by 
equally dramatic reductions in fertility (see Figure 10).  Fertility decisions seem to respond 
strongly to changes in child mortality as parents realize that if fewer children are likely to 
die in childhood, they can give birth to fewer children to attain their desired number of 
offspring.  This desire to rein in fertility is reflected in trends in the use of contraceptives.  
Worldwide, more than half of couples now use contraception, compared with 10% in the 
1960s
36. In Bangladesh, for example, the percentage of couples using contraception 
tripled, to 31 percent, in just fourteen years.
37  
Other changes have reinforced the trend towards lowered fertility, as it becomes 
advantageous to have smaller families.  If children have a higher chance of survival and a 
long life expectancy, it is wise to invest intensively in them.  A major form of investment is 
education ￿ an investment that becomes more tempting when economic changes are 
likely to increase the potential returns on education.  However, this requires a long-term 
commitment.  In a rural society, children typically start working on the land quite early 
and become economically productive at a young age.  Educating children limits their 
productivity during childhood (they are at school rather than working).  However, with 
increasing urbanization, children are less likely to be economically productive, while, in a 
labor market that places a greater premium on skills, education makes a greater 
difference to their future productivity.  Thus urbanization raises the incentive of parents to 
educate their children at the same time as it reduces the opportunity cost of education in 
terms of forgone labor income.  Education is expensive. It therefore becomes more likely 
that couples will choose to invest greater resources in fewer children. A greater emphasis 
on education will inevitably lead to more educated women.  This reinforces the likelihood 
that families will become smaller: women￿s time becomes more valuable and they are less 
                                                           
36 uk@earth.people: poverty and the environment, 1997, Department for International Development, 
London  
37 MD Shahid Ullah and Nitai Chakraborty (1993): Factors affecting the use of contraception in Bangladesh: 
a multivariate analysis. Asia Pacific Population Journal, Vol 8 No 3 (1993, pp 19-30). UNESCAP. 
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likely to want to spend so much of their adult life bearing and raising children.
38 For many 
reasons, then, smaller families make increasingly sound economic sense once the 
demographic transition gets underway.
39  
The decline in mortality and the decline in fertility jointly form the demographic transition 
￿ but they are not synchronized.  The lag between the two causes population growth ￿ as 
fertility only begins to decline some time after mortality has dropped (see Figures 11 and 
12). This growth at the beginning of the demographic transition has preoccupied the 
prevailing views of population change and economic growth. However, the demographic 
transition also has a predictable impact on a country￿s age structure.  At first, there is a 
cohort of children that includes many who would previously have suffered an early death. 
This baby boom generation is unique: as fertility rates decline and families grow smaller, 
successive cohorts tend to be smaller. The result is a ￿bulge￿ in the age structure, a 
demographic wave that works its way through the population. (Figures 13, 14, and 15 
show this moving bulge, and successive waves of it, for developing countries, East Asia, 
and Ireland, respectively. Figure 16 shows that only the beginnings of such a bulge are 
evident in Sub-Saharan Africa ).  First there are many young people, who need to be fed, 
clothed, housed, cared for medically, and educated.  Then they become adults who are 
more likely to spend only part of the income they generate on their own needs.  The rest 
is used to provide for children or is saved, most often for retirement.  Finally, there is a 
large cohort of elderly people, who work less ￿ or not at all ￿ and become dependent 
again. They either live off their own savings or are supported by their families or the 
state.  
The effects of the modern demographic transition can be felt for several generations.   An 
initial spurt of population growth occurs between the beginning of the mortality decline 
and the end of the fertility decline.  But when the baby boom generation itself reaches the 
                                                           
38 Birdsall, Nancy, Allen C. Kelley, and Steven W. Sinding, eds., Population Matters: Demographic Change, 
Economic Growth, and Poverty in the Developing World. Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 13. 
39 See, for example, http://www.popcouncil.org/publications/wp/prd/123.html for Mark R. Montgomery, 
Mary Aruends-Kuenning and Cem Mete￿s paper, ￿The Quantity-Quality Transition in Asia￿ (1999), which 
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prime reproductive years, it creates its own echo: a succeeding baby-boom. Subsequent 
echo effects produce further spurts. In other words, even if total fertility rates have been 
reduced to replacement level (2.1 children per woman), the population will continue to 
grow until the members of the bulge generation and successive echo generations tend to  
have passed through their prime reproductive years.
40  This process is called population 
momentum, and its effects will be felt for 70 to 100 years before the population age 
structure settles down. Due to the effect of population momentum alone, the population 
of developing countries as a whole is expected to increase by 40 per cent between 1995 
and 2100.
41  
While population growth has been explored quite fully by economists, far less attention 
has been paid to changes in the age structure brought about by the demographic 
transition.  Combining the population growth rate and the growth rate of the economically 
active population captures the way that age structures change and delivers striking 
results.
42  While population growth has a large and statistically significant negative effect 
on per capita income growth, this effect is counteracted by a statistically significant 
positive effect from growth in the share of the population that is economically active.  
While the age structure remains constant, therefore, the effect of population growth is 
neutral, but as the proportion of workers rises or falls, so do opportunities for economic 
growth.  The demographic dividend, for example, was essential to East Asia￿s 
extraordinary economic achievements, accounting for as much as one-third of its 
"economic miracle".
43 The ￿Celtic Tiger￿ (referring to the rapid economic growth in 
present-day Ireland) appears to be another powerful illustration of this same 
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41 See John Bongaarts, "Future Population Growth and Policy Options" and David E. Bloom, "Population 
Growth, Structure, and Policy: Comment", both in Andrew Mason, Thomas Merrick, and R. Paul Shaw, eds., 
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phenomenon.  Figure 17 shows how the share of the working-age population has varied 
over time in different regions of the world. Figure 18 highlights the same fact for East 
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Ireland.  
However, this demographic dividend is not inevitable.  It has to be earned. Without the 
right policy environment, countries will be too slow to adapt to their changing age 
structure and, at best, will miss an opportunity to secure high growth.  At worst, where an 
increase in the working-age population is not matched by increased job opportunities, 
they will face costly penalties, such as rising unemployment and perhaps also higher crime 
rates and political instability. With no policies in place to provide for rising numbers of old 
people, many will face destitution in their final years.
44  In addition, the demographic 
dividend is time-limited.  Many developed nations are facing the end of their demographic 
transition, and now must plan for their aging populations and a decline in their worker-to-
dependents ratio.  Additionally, some are experiencing shrinking populations.  Low fertility 
rates over an extended period of time, where replacement fertility (2.1 children per 
woman) is not reached, eventually lead to population decline.  Italy￿s population, currently 
at 57 million, is projected to decline to 43 million by 2050. Japan￿s population is expected 
to decrease from 127 million to 109 million by 2050.
45  The available labor force will 
decrease, and the elderly will increasingly make up a larger proportion of the population, 
bringing with it further social and economic challenges.
46  Through the lens of 
demography at least, the next 50 years presents the developed world with significant 
challenges, at the same time as it offers the developing world a number of appealing 
opportunities.
47 
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The Demographic ￿Dividend￿ 
The demographic dividend is delivered through a number of mechanisms. The most 
important are labor supply
48, savings, and human capital. 
Labor supply: 
The demographic transition affects labor supply in two ways. First, there is an essentially 
mechanical effect, based on the regular and inevitable aging of the baby boom 
generation. When this generation is between 15 and 64, it is more likely to be working, 
thus lowering the ratio of dependents to non-dependents.  (Figure 19 shows labor force 
participation rates by age group.) During the peak working years of 25 to 59, this effect is 
especially strong.  The number of people who would like to work (labor supply) therefore 
gets bigger, and provided the labor market can absorb the larger numbers of workers, per 
capita production increases.   
Second, women are more likely to enter the workforce, as family size declines.
 49 This 
effect is magnified by the fact that, with adult women themselves more likely to have 
been brought up in small families, they are more likely to be educated. This increases 
their productivity in the labor market, underlining progress towards a stronger workforce 
and smaller families. 
Savings: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
increases in net in-migration, which tends to be selective of working-age individuals. For example, the 
female labor force participation rate in Italy is 33%, while in Japan it is 44%. These contrast with rates of 
48% in Canada and 51% in Sweden. Even more telling is the fact that the difference between the male and 
female labor force participation rate in Italy (23%) and Japan (21%) are higher than for most high-income 
countries (e.g., the differences for France  and the United Kingdom are 12% and 14%, respectively). (World 
Development Indicators 2001, data for 1999). Finally, retirement ages have been relatively stagnant in 
comparison with life expectancy. Between 1965 and 2000, Italy’s life expectancy increased from 71 to 79, 
and Japan’s from 71 to 81. By comparison, retirement age in Italy is 62 (up from 61 for men and 56 for 
women during that period) and 65 in Japan. An upward adjustment of the retirement age could mitigate the 
labor force effects of population aging. 
48 See Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla, 2000, ￿Labor Force Dynamics and Economic Growth,￿ paper presented 
at the August 2000 Summer Institute of the National Bureau of Economic Research, Labor Studies Program. 
49 See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/newsletr/nine.htm   22
The demographic transition also encourages the growth of savings, thus improving a 
country￿s prospects for investment and growth.  Again, there is an accounting and a 
behavioral effect at work. The young and the old consume more than they generate, 
unlike working-age people, who tend to have a higher level of economic outputs, and also 
a higher level of savings.
50  Further, people tend to save more between the ages of 40 
and 65, when they are less likely to be investing in their children and the need to prepare 
for their retirement is becoming more pressing.
51  So when large numbers of baby 
boomers start hitting their forties, national savings will tend to rise.
52  Incentives to make 
certain choices can reinforce this tendency to save among the new young baby boomers. 
Improved health, and longevity, make saving easier and more attractive.
53  A healthy 
population must plan far in advance if it is to maintain its standard of living through 
decades of retirement.
54  Pensions are made even more important by smaller families and 
the mobility urbanization brings.  An extended family often takes care of its own elderly 
relatives.  A nuclear family, with both parents working, is far less likely to do so, although 
the latter￿s increased assets make it better able to provide care financially, if not 
physically.  Additionally, private household savings can provide the capital accumulation 
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paper presented to the WHO Commission on Macroeconomics and Health, November 2000.  
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needed to finance growth, as seen in East Asia.
55, 
56 Further work is needed, however, to 
take account of the institutional features of pension systems when assessing the 
importance of the demographic transition to the determination of national savings.  
Human capital: 
Finally, the demographic transition has significant effects on investments in human 
capital, effects which are the least tangible, but may be the most significant and far-
reaching.  The demographic transition begins with changes in mortality that result in a 
population that lives longer and stays healthier. A longer life expectancy causes 
fundamental changes in the way that people live.  Attitudes to education, family, 
retirement, the role of women and work all tend to shift.  A society, especially if it is 
taking full advantage of the demographic dividend, is certain to experience deep-rooted 
changes in its culture, as its people become more valuable assets.  Take education, for 
example:  The positive correlation between education and earnings is well known.  In 
Latin America, for example, a worker with 6 years of education earns an average of 50 
per cent more than someone who has no formal education. The premium increases to 120 
per cent for those with 12 years of education (i.e. finishing secondary school), and 
exceeds 200 per cent for those with 17 years of education (i.e. completing tertiary 
education).
57  As life expectancy increases, parents are likely to choose to educate their 
children to more advanced levels. Healthier children, in turn, tend to experience greater 
cognitive development per year of schooling than their less healthy counterparts.
58  The 
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parents also know that there is a good chance that each child will benefit from schooling 
investments over a long working life and, with fewer children, can devote more time and 
money to each child.  The result of this educational investment is that the labor force as a 
whole becomes more productive, promoting higher wages and a better standard of living.  
Women and men therefore tend to enter the workforce later, partly because they are 
being educated for longer, but they are likely to be more productive once they start 
working.
59  
All these mechanisms are heavily dependent on the policy environment.  A growing 
number of adults will only be productive if there is sufficient flexibility in the labor market 
to allow its expansion, and macroeconomic policies that permit and encourage 
investment.  Similarly, people will only save if they have access to adequate saving 
mechanisms and have confidence in domestic financial markets.  Finally, the demographic 
transition creates conditions where people will tend to invest in their health and 
education, offering great economic benefits, especially in the modern world￿s increasingly 
sophisticated economies.  But governments invariably play a vital role in creating an 
environment where high quality health and education provision is possible ￿ necessary 
steps to make the most of their country￿s demographic opportunities.  
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Chapter 3  Case Studies of Population Change and Economic Growth  
This chapter examines the interplay between demographic change and economic growth 
in five specific areas of the world:  East Asia, Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
Middle East and North Africa, and Japan.  The East Asian nations have experienced the 
most success in exploiting the ￿demographic dividend￿ made available by reduced fertility.  
Latin America has undergone a less dramatic transition and has had far less success in 
creating conditions for economic growth.  The Middle East and North Africa are still in 
much earlier stages of the demographic transition, and indeed many parts of Sub-Saharan 
Africa have seen virtually no decreases in traditionally high fertility rates.  Japan, a 
developed country with an aging population, illustrates the ￿back end￿ of the demographic 
transition:  it is facing the issues posed by a declining work force and an increasing ratio 
of elderly dependents.   
East Asia 
The East Asian "economic miracle" offers some of the most compelling evidence in recent 
history of the "demographic dividend".
60  The East Asian demographic transition occurred 
with relative rapidity, over a 50- to 75-year period ￿ the fastest demographic transition to 
date.
61 Modern transitions are faster because countries gain the benefit of knowledge, 
experience, or technology developed by others.
62   
Throughout the world, dramatic improvements in public health emerged from the late 
1940s onwards, largely through improved sanitation, safer water, and the development of 
broad-spectrum antibiotics and antimicrobials (for example, penicillin, sulfa drugs, 
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streptomycin, bacitracin, chloroquine, and tetracycline, discovered and introduced 
between 1920 and 1940, and the use of DDT from 1943). From the 1950s onwards, there 
were significant and sustained declines in infant and child mortality. The infant mortality 
rate (the proportion of babies who die before their first birthday) in Asia as a whole 
dropped from 182 per 1,000 in 1950 to 53 per 1,000 in 2000.
63 In time, the effect of the 
decrease in mortality carried through to a fall in fertility rates.  This was assisted by family 
planning programs, which made birth control both easier and more socially acceptable. In 
the 1950s East Asia￿s developing countries used voluntary programs of incentives to 
encourage families to have fewer children, and the transition from high to replacement 
level fertility took less than 30 years.
64 In 1950 the typical East Asian woman had six 
children ￿ today she has two. In the lag between the decrease in infant mortality and the 
decline in fertility, a ￿baby boom￿ generation was created.
65    
The East Asian demographic transition was one of the critical factors in the region￿s 
spectacular economic growth.
66  Between 1965 and 1990, per capita income rose annually 
by over 6 per cent. One explanation for this phenomenal growth is that in the late 1960s, 
when the baby boom generation started work, their entry into the workforce changed the 
proportion of workers to dependents in the population.  With the benefits of a good 
education and a liberalized trade environment, this generation was absorbed into the job 
market and into gainful employment, thereby increasing the region￿s capacity for 
economic production.  The region￿s working-age population grew nearly four times faster 
(an average of 2.4% a year) than its dependent population between 1965 and 1990. A 
virtuous spiral was thus created, whereby population change increased income growth, 
and income growth pushed down population growth ￿ and therefore the number of 
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63 United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision. 
64 Mason (2001) ibid: 31 
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66 See Bloom, David E. and Jeffrey Williamson, ￿Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in 
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dependents ￿ by reducing fertility.
67 East Asia￿s high savings rates were also affected by 
the demographic transition, as the baby boom generation entered the workforce and 
parents had fewer children to take care of, although the extent of the effect is disputed in 
the literature.
68 Results from Bloom and Sachs (1998), Bloom and Williamson (1998), and 
Bloom, Canning, and Malaney (2000) suggest that the demographic dividend accounts for 
between one-fourth and two-fifths of East Asia￿s "economic miracle".  Growth accounting 
presented by Mason (2001) further confirms the results of the regression analyses in 
these works. 
Yet as its baby boom cohort ages, East Asia must prepare for an aging population. Not 
only did infant mortality decrease, but mortality at other ages fell as well and, as a result, 
life expectancy has risen from around 43 years in 1950 to 72 years today. Population 
growth has slowed dramatically ￿ from a peak of 2.4 per cent a year in the late 1960s, it 
is now 0.66 per cent a year, and predicted to be only 0.2 per cent by 2025. When the 
baby boom retires, the ratio of dependents to workers will change again, and bring added 
challenges to policy makers and the economy. Japan￿s dependency ratio, which remained 
around the 0.45 mark throughout the 1990s, will reach 0.96 by 2050
69 (see detailed 
discussion of Japan below).  Pensions and health care for the elderly will come under 
strain and economic growth is likely to shrink as the labor force declines.   
An aging population is, fundamentally, a mark of development success.  However, the 
aged face a range of potential problems, including poverty (Japan has elderly poverty 
rates above 18%
70). Additionally, the speed of change in the modern world ￿ including 
profound changes in family and social patterns ￿ means that policymakers worldwide will 
be hard pressed to ensure that the challenge of an aging society does not become a 
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crisis.
71 They will also need to address the fact that a significant proportion of the elderly 
are women, who often suffer a double disempowerment based on age and gender.  
East Asia, with its mix of advanced and developing economies, can expect a variable set 
of challenges to emerge in the next decade or so.  The challenge is already present in 
some of the richest countries in the region, like Korea and Hong Kong. In the medium 
term, over the next decade or so, the problem of aging populations will also become more 
pressing in less wealthy countries such as China.
72 
Japan 
Japan is the world￿s most rapidly aging country, with life expectancy the highest in the 
world.  A Japanese person born today can expect to live until 81. Whereas in 1920 the 
median age of a person in Japan was only 27 years, today it stands at over 40 years.  
Fertility rates are low in Japan ￿ at 1.3 children per woman.  The consequences of Japan￿s 
rapidly aging population are already being felt, as policymakers strive to prepare for the 
challenge of an increasingly elderly population.  Today, around four people of working age 
support each pensioner, but in 2025 falling birth rates are expected to halve that figure. 
In 1950 the figure was 12:1.
73  
Japan is coming towards the end of its demographic transition, having enjoyed the 
economic successes of its demographic gift, combined with strong policies.  After the 
Second World War, Japan was in economic crisis.  The war had destroyed nearly half of 
the nation￿s industrial plants and infrastructure.  However, with a series of policies 
concentrating on building modern factories, and a well-educated and highly literate work 
force, Japan was able to push its economy to the forefront of technology and modernity, 
establishing itself as one of the world￿s most powerful economies.  
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Government/industry cooperation, a well-educated and motivated work force, a focus on 
technology, and a comparatively small defense allocation (1 per cent of GDP) contributed 
to Japan￿s economic success.  
But now 17% of Japan￿s population is 65 years old or over (see Figure 20). In 2050, 42% 
of the population will be aged 60+, with 15% aged 80+; the dependency ratio will rise 
from 47% to 96%.
74 Their care needs (medical, social, and financial) represent a 
significant challenge.  Forty per cent of the 65+ population in Japan live either alone or as 
a couple.  With the breakdown of extended families, the elderly cannot depend on their 
families to provide for them, and the state must prepare to step into the gap. 
Pensions are a particular challenge, given that many countries finance pension payments 
from current taxation. With a smaller, young workforce supporting a pay-as-you-go 
pension system, spending on pensions could push Japan￿s budget deficit up to 20 per cent 
of GDP by 2030.  Pension contributions will have to increase to 35 per cent of salaries to 
maintain the current level of payouts.  
Finally, with the drop in fertility rates, and many people retiring, the number of people 
working will become smaller, further challenging Japan￿s economy and slowing growth.
 75  
But Japan will not be alone in having to face such challenges in the coming decades.  
Several of the available reforms proposed by, among others, the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development
76, including labor and product reforms and fiscal 
consolidation, represent good governance strategies irrespective of the aging issue.  
Nevertheless, the growing proportion of the elderly will no doubt exert significant 
additional pressure on policymakers. 
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OECD, North America and Western Europe
77 
The developed world has reached an advanced stage of the demographic transition. 
Fertility rates are below replacement level, and populations are growing at a slow pace. 
North America continues to grow largely because of its high rates of net migration and 
large population of childbearing age, while Western Europe￿s population has plateaued 
and will begin a slight decline in a few decades. From 2001 to 2025, the population of 
Europe as a whole is expected to decline by 6%, that of Japan by 3%, and North 
America￿s will grow by 21%. Sub-Saharan Africa, on the other hand, is projected to grow 
by 74%.
78  
The demographic transition in the developed world began in the 19
th century. Infant 
mortality in England and Wales declined from 154 deaths per 1000 live births in 1861 to 
21 deaths 100 years later. Life expectancy also rose over the same period, with male life 
expectancy rising from 40 to 68. Fertility also fell, in most countries by about  50% 
between 1870 and 1940.
79 During the late 19th and early 20th century, the working-age 
population began to grow more quickly than the young dependent population, potentially 
contributing to the acceleration of economic development that occurred in the West in this 
period.
80  After World War II, however, increased optimism about the future saw fertility 
rates in the West shoot up. From a low of 2.2 children per woman in the 1930s, US 
fertility rates rose to a high of 3.8 in 1957. The pattern in the United Kingdom, Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand was similarly dramatic.
81 Fertility rates only began to fall again 
in 1960, declining sharply and reaching replacement levels in the mid-1970s. Other 
Western European countries also experienced fertility rises after World War II, although 
on a smaller scale. The famous ￿baby boom￿ generation was thus created. Some research 
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finds that these post-World War II demographic changes had a significant effect on 
growth.  Population growth among middle-aged adults promotes income growth, 
population growth among the old-aged tends to slow growth, while population growth 
among young adults seems to make no contribution.
82 
Caplow, Hicks, Wattenberg (2001) note that fertility in the wealthy industrial countries has 
continued to fall, and is likely to remain below the replacement level of 2.1 births per 
woman well into the 21st century. The baby boom generation is now approaching 
retirement age, and the continued decline in fertility rates has meant that the West now 
faces the problem of an aging society, where an increased cohort of elderly relies on a 
reduced working-age population. The UN Population Division has forecast that the 
percentage of people aged 60 or over in the developed regions will rise from 19% in 2000 
to 33% by 2050.
83 Furthermore, the dependency balance has shifted. In 1950, children 
made up 27% of the population in these regions and people aged 60 or over 12%. By 
2050, however, this situation will be reversed, with the proportion of older people rising to 
33% and that of children falling to 16%. 
Population aging is most advanced in Europe and Japan. The median age of Europeans is 
expected to rise from 38 in 2000 to 49 in 2050, and the median age in Japan is already 
41.
84 So, whereas South-central Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa￿s policymakers should be 
looking at ways to capture a future demographic dividend, the governments of the 
developed world, whose dividend is about to expire, are likely to find coping with an aging 
population high up their list of priorities. Aging populations will put pressure on social 
security systems, health services and pensions, as the smaller working-age group 
contributes fewer taxes and the economy, potentially, shrinks.  
The United States￿ welcoming of immigrants, which will ensure that the working-age 
population continues to grow, is in marked contrast to Japan￿s policy, where immigrants 
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make up just 1.2% of the population. Western Europe is more open than Japan, although 
current policies will see its population shrink slightly and age over the next 50 years.  
Public sector reform will focus on health care, pensions and social security. Private health 
care and pensions are likely to become more important along with public/private 
partnerships in health care provision,
85 and raising the retirement age and encouraging 
people to work into retirement via tax breaks and lifelong training have also been 
mooted.
86 
Some have even predicted great difficulties for the West as a result of the aging boom,
87 
but changing habits, whereby people turn to private health care and pensions, retire later 
and do more work for longer are likely to soften the blow. Changing immigration patterns 
will also play a part in averting economic collapse.
88 The private sector is likely to have a 
vital role to play both in provision of public services and attracting immigration. Engaging 
private enterprise will require a change in attitudes, particularly in those Western 
European countries used to overbearing public sector bureaucracies, so change is likely to 
be slow. Policymakers will have to focus on facilitating these changes, and prompt action 
now will ease the pain later. 
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South-central and Southeast Asia
89 
South and Southeast Asia have lagged behind East Asia in the demographic transition.  
However, Southeast Asia has recently begun to benefit from the demographic dividend, 
and South-central Asia is likely to follow.
90  
Until 1950, population growth rates across Asia had remained relatively stable at less than 
1% per year for at least the previous 70 years. However, from 1950 to 1990, rates in 
South-central and Southeast Asia shot up, averaging well over 2% per year. These rates 
were lower than in Africa, but similar to Latin America and well ahead of East Asia, North 
America and Europe. This growth can firstly be attributed to falling mortality rates. The 
introduction of drugs to treat diseases such as tuberculosis, scarlet fever and pneumonia, 
coupled with the use of anti-malaria drug DDT, saw infant mortality rates in particular 
decline dramatically. As in East Asia, fertility declines followed the fall in mortality. Health 
improvements have meant that families have needed fewer children in order to ensure 
desired family sizes. Family planning programs have also had an impact. The fall in 
Southeast Asia’s fertility rate has been nearly as dramatic as that of East Asia, while 
South-central Asia￿s average number of births per woman has been nearly halved since 
1960. Southeast Asia￿s rate is expected to come close to East Asia￿s rate by 2020. This will 
eventually lead to a decline in growth rates to around 1% by a few by approximately 
2020.
91,92 
As well as the size of the region￿s population, therefore, its structure has also changed. As 
shown in Table 3, although South-central and Southeast Asia￿s economically active 
population grew in comparison with their economically dependent population from 1965-
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1990, the difference was much less marked than that in East Asia (Table 4 gives the 
analogous figures for all regions of the world through 2015). As a consequence, the 
demographic dividend has so far been less pronounced. While East Asia￿s working 
population made up over 65% of the total population in 1990, Southeast and South-
central Asia￿s was less than 60%. Moreover, the ratio in East Asia rose sharply in the 15 
years from 1975, while in the rest of Asia it rose more steadily. By 2025, Southeast Asia 
will match, and South-central Asia will nearly match, the figure for East Asia. Consistent 
with this, dependency ratios have fallen more slowly in Southeast and South-central Asia, 
with the latter’s youth dependency ratios in particular (the percentage of under 15 year 
olds compared to the working age population) experiencing only modest declines. 
While Southeast Asia has already gained considerable economic benefit from its 
demographic change (which accounts for about 1% of per capita annual income growth) 
and is likely to see this benefit reduced over the next 25 years as the population ages, 
South-central Asia￿s transition is still continuing, suggesting growing potential for 
economic growth. More specifically, the current demographic dividend of approximately 
0.7% of per capita annual income growth could well double as the boom reaches its 
peak.
93  
In order to fully capitalize on the demographic dividend, however, South-central Asia will 
do well to follow the policy initiatives employed so successfully by East Asia. Fertility in the 
region is still high at around 3.2 births per woman in 2000 (the rates in Southeast Asia 
and East Asia are 2.5 and 1.8 respectively
94). Family planning programs will help to push 
fertility rates down, and will have the corollary effect of limiting the spread of HIV/AIDS. 
As the Asian Development Bank has shown, there is a large unmet demand for 
contraception across South and Southeast Asia and eliminating all unwanted births would 
go a long way towards reducing fertility to replacement levels. 
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Education and training are other key areas that determine the success of a country￿s 
efforts to capture a demographic dividend. Although primary and secondary enrollment 
levels in Asia have risen dramatically in recent decades, the demand for quality tertiary 
education is as yet largely unmet. The emerging global economy places increasing 
emphasis on higher education. Many countries in the region may not be able to take full 
advantage of their favorable demographic indicators because of relatively low rates of 
tertiary enrollment. New approaches to funding and a new focus on high-value areas such 
as technology and tourism will be required if the region is to catch up with the likes of 
North America.
95 India, with its burgeoning information technology sector, has already 
seen, via job creation, remittances, and FDI, the benefits of investment in quality higher 
education and a focus on core new economy subjects.
96  
The new economy will also require a focus on lifelong training. As a country￿s economy 
moves up the value chain, workers will need to be re-trained to cope with the demands of 
a flexible labor market. This should be combined with labor market flexibility. If the South-
central Asian labor market cannot cope with the huge influx of workers produced by the 
demographic shift, a potential virtuous spiral, with a bigger labor force contributing to 
increased productivity and higher savings rates, could be reversed, with rising 
unemployment levels leading to crime, poverty and civil disorder. 
As in East Asia and the West, policy will also need to look to the long-term, when the 
boom generation retires. Health care systems and pensions will come under pressure, and 
the private sector may be usefully harnessed to help drive reform efforts.  
The importance of policy to the success of attempts to capture the demographic dividend 
was demonstrated in East Asia. Southeast Asia, whose transition is fairly well advanced, 
and South-central Asia, whose potential boom is yet to come, cannot assume that 
demography alone will guarantee economic growth. Many governments in these regions 
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have made a good start in certain key areas ￿ Bangladesh has had great success with  
family planning programs, for example, India with basic and secondary education and the 
technology sector, Thailand with health efforts which have limited the spread of AIDS, 
and many of the countries of Southeast Asia in liberalizing labor markets and attracting 
foreign investment. However, there is more work to be done, and, with the demographic 
shift advancing, the quicker it is done the better. Fertility levels are still high, tertiary 
education is weak and exports are underdeveloped. The potential is there for the rest of 
Asia to do as well as East Asia, and the region￿s success will depend on its policymakers. 
Latin America 
Latin America￿s population growth is following a similar pattern to East Asia￿s.  In 1965 life 
expectancy in Latin America and East Asia was in the upper 50s.  Following similar 
improvements in public health, Latin America’s life expectancy now stands at 70 years, 
slightly behind East Asia￿s 72.  There have also been significant reductions in infant 
mortality in Latin America, which decreased from 91 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1965 
to 32 in 2000: a figure very similar to East Asia￿s 34.  The fertility rate has also fallen ￿ 
from around 5 children per woman in 1975 to the present 2.5.  In some countries in the 
region, such as Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, the fertility rate is just above replacement 
levels (2.1 children per woman).
97 Barbados, Cuba, and Trinidad and Tobago are far 
below this level.  Other countries, however, have much higher rates. In Bolivia, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Paraguay, women are having approximately 4 children.
98  
It may be significant that income disparities in the region are also the widest for any 
region in the world (although Sub-Saharan Africa runs a close second).  
Although Latin American demographic changes have been favorable for growth since 
1970, economic growth has yet to follow the East Asian example. So while East Asia 
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shows a per capita annual growth rate between 1975 and 1995 of 6.8 per cent, the 
growth rate for Latin America over the same period is one-eighth of that, at 0.7 per cent. 
Although there has been much debate surrounding Latin America￿s failure to thrive, there 
appears to be a growing consensus that the heart of the matter concerns policy.
99 Military 
juntas and dictators ruled much of Latin America for most of the 20
th century, until the 
late 1970s. Between 1978 and 1990, 15 Latin American countries abandoned such 
regimes and took tentative steps towards democracy.  
Economic changes in the region were also dramatic, with a growing adoption of the 
Washington Consensus in the late 1980s and 1990s.
100 Between 1965 and 1990, Latin 
America was largely closed off from the world economy. By 1980, only 12 per cent of the 
region counted as being open. Cross-country regression analysis suggests that a country 
with a working-age population growing 3 percent per year, and 1.5 percent faster than its 
overall population, will see its growth boosted by 0.5 per cent a year if its economy is 
closed, but by 1.5 percent a year if its economy is open.
101 In other words, a policy of 
openness can triple the size of the demographic dividend the country collects. A 
retrospective analysis suggests that had the region been completely open between 1965 
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and 1985, Latin America￿s growth would have averaged 0.9 percentage points, per 
annum, higher. This would have doubled growth for each year, on average, during that 
period.
102  
A combination of weak governance and a lack of openness to trade appears to have 
slowed the potential growth that demographic changes might have brought to Latin 
America.  This interaction is important.  Analysis shows that the direct effect of changing 
age structure accounts for only 11 per cent, or 0.6 percentage points, of the growth gap 
between Latin America and the fastest-growing East Asian economies.  However, when 
the interactive effect of policy and demography are also accounted for, some 50 per cent 
of the gap is accounted for.
103  In other words, countries in East Asia pursued a range of 
policies (especially trade policies that created substantial numbers of new jobs) that 
allowed them to take much fuller advantage of their demographic dividend.  Latin America 
has yet to take such advantage of its population dynamics.   
So while the demographic transition produces favorable conditions, it does not guarantee 
that an increased supply of workers will be gainfully employed.  Nor does it ensure that 
those who wish to save will find themselves encouraged to do so. Neither can it provide 
institutions to press home health advantages or to create the educated population vital to 
a high-value society. Latin America began its transition, but was over-reliant on domestic 
demand and did not export vigorously. Many of its governments were corrupt, and 
repeated financial disasters had the effect of making saving ill-advised.
104  
There are signs of hope, however.  Between 1990 and 1995, approximately 70 per cent of 
the region opened up to the world economy, reflecting substantial policy reform. And it 
could have been worse, of course. With even more unsuitable policies, the baby-boomers 
could have become a heavy burden, rather than a help, as the unemployed acted as a 
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drag on the economy and damaged the fabric of society. The opportunity to benefit from 
a dividend is not yet lost. Mortality and fertility rates are still in decline, so Latin America 
can still benefit ￿ but only if its policymakers act decisively and appropriately. 
Middle East and North Africa 
Most Middle East and North African (MENA) countries are at relatively early stages of their 
demographic transitions, having achieved relatively high life expectancy.  Across the 
region life expectancy is 65 years, the world average.  Fertility rates, however, remain 
relatively high, and as a region are second only to Sub-Saharan Africa, with an average of 
over four children per woman. In 1997 in Jordan, for example, the average woman would 
have 5 babies; while in Egypt she would have 3 or 4 and in Yemen 7 or 8.
105  
The region has also seen healthy economic growth over the last two decades, and some 
of this is due to the growth in the working-age population.  In Egypt, the demographic 
transition through 1990 is estimated to have accounted for one-sixth of the growth of 
Egypt￿s income per capita between 1965 and 1990.
106  Jordan￿s transition started earlier, 
and the country will see dependency ratios falling from 1.0 in 1990 to around 0.48 in 
2040.  This has been estimated to account for nearly half of Jordan￿s future predicted per 
capita growth rate.
107 
However, if fertility rates do not fall, the ratio of workers to dependents will not change 
dramatically, and the region will see population growth without the opportunity for 
dramatic economic growth.  Models show that the effect of fertility rates on the annual 
growth rate of GDP per capita is substantial ￿ in Syria, for example, economic growth 
could be raised significantly if the ratio of working-age to total population was changed 
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through a low fertility rate: analysis suggests an effect as great as 1.62 percentage points 
on the annual growth rate of GDP per capita.
108 
Policy will be a significant factor in determining whether MENA countries are to enjoy the 
demographic dividend.  Openness to global trade, as well as policies to support 
employment and education, can help countries to absorb the baby boom generation of 
workers into productive and remunerative employment.  Saudi Arabia, for example, is 
currently facing the prospect of mass unemployment among graduates and school-
leavers.  Sixty per cent of the current population is under 25.  Some analysts blame 
foreign investment trickling out of Saudi Arabia, alongside an outdated education system, 
which has not equipped Saudi nationals for work in a global economy.  Among other 
factors, some blame Saudi labor laws, which discourage private companies from 
employing Saudis because it is extremely difficult to dismiss a Saudi national who is not 
doing his job.  
People are naturally enterprising, provided their opportunities to work are not stifled by 
bureaucracy, uncompetitive environments, lack of available capital for investment, or an 
absence of skills.  The region needs to work towards more liberal labor markets, while 
also investing in education and training to ensure wider access to opportunities.  It will 
also need to encourage foreign and internal investment.  If it can achieve these changes, 
combined with decreasing fertility, then the Middle East and North Africa could benefit 
from its dividend; if it doesn￿t it will increasingly face the problems that Saudi Arabia is 
struggling to resolve today.  
Sub-Saharan Africa 
This region has yet to experience the typical demographic transition.  While mortality has 
declined, following the pattern in other areas (infant mortality fell by 43% from 1960 to 
2000), fertility has not (declining only 19% in the same period). Rather than a baby boom 
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￿ where the number of births rises for a period before falling as fertility declines ￿ this has 
resulted in an unprecedented population explosion, with the 1950 population expected to 
have quadrupled to 718 million by 2004.  Dependency ratios have, unlike in all other 
regions of the world, correspondingly risen. Whereas most areas￿ working-age (15-64 year 
old) population makes up 60% to 70% of the total, only 53% of Sub-Saharan Africa￿s 
people are in this age group. The baby boom has seen the working-age population in 
most areas grow 0.35% per year faster than the total population, but in Sub-Saharan 
Africa it has grown at a similar rate to the total.
109 With AIDS now killing off large sections 
of that working population and actually bringing average age down in many countries, the 
region has had no demographic dividend to reap.
110 
Although demographers tend to agree that Sub-Saharan Africa will experience a fertility 
transition, there remain disputes concerning its timing, the reasons underpinning 
continued high fertility rates, and what the best interventions might be.  As Bloom and 
Sachs have noted, "Africa￿s demographic uniqueness [over the past half century]￿is not 
in the level of fertility but in the persistence of such a high level of fertility in the face of 
mortality declines."
111 High fertility has been the major component of its sluggish 
demographic transition and a major cause of its massive population growth.  Compared 
with other developing regions in 1960, Sub-Saharan Africa started with a slightly higher 
total fertility rate of 6.7 children per woman. By the mid-1990s, dramatic reductions had 
occurred elsewhere ￿ to 3.0 children per woman in Latin America, 3.8 in South-central 
Asia, and 2.2 in East Asia. During that period, all three regions saw a surge in 
contraception use: the percentage of married women aged 15-49 using contraception 
rose from around 13 percent to 80 percent in East Asia, from 7 to 40 percent in South 
Asia, and from 14 to 67 percent in Latin America. The figures for Africa over that time 
period are much less dramatic, rising from around 5 percent to just 18 percent, with 
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fertility remaining at 5.7 children per woman.
112  While some countries, in particular those 
of Southern Africa (Namibia, Botswana, South Africa and Zimbabwe) and Kenya, have 
achieved this rate, and are seeing the beginnings of a transition, the majority of Sub-
Saharan African countries have yet to reach this threshold, and face a much longer road 
to declining fertility rates.
113   
There are various reasons for this continued high fertility.  With limited financial 
infrastructure in rural areas offering little incentive or means to save, children are still 
viewed as insurance against old age. They are also a key source of labor.  Furthermore, 
and despite medical advances, infectious disease is still widespread, particularly in rural 
areas, so cultural norms and policies encouraging high fertility in order to achieve desired 
family sizes (such as child fosterage, polygyny and the distribution of land according to 
family size) are changing only slowly. 
Africa is a continent of extremes, and in the last 30 years, it has faced a series of 
prolonged and debilitating wars.  Wars not only kill and injure soldiers and civilians alike; 
they also destroy infrastructure and social structures, which in turn has a negative impact 
on a population￿s health. Life expectancy in Mozambique, for example, is now down to 38 
years. There is an argument, however, that the relationship between war and health runs 
two ways, creating a vicious spiral: because a shorter life expectancy can lead to different 
perceptions of risk, it contributes to the belligerence of a population, and thus greater 
willingness to engage in war.  
Another aspect of the problems facing Sub-Saharan Africa is the virulence of infectious 
diseases. Despite some impressive health gains over the last century, malaria, HIV/AIDS, 
and TB are just three of the big killers that are not yet successfully controlled. Malaria and 
HIV alone currently account for 3-4 million of Sub-Saharan Africa￿s roughly 10 million 
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annual deaths. HIV is particularly virulent in Sub-Saharan Africa, where many countries 
have ten or more people living with HIV for each person who has already died from the 
disease. Between 1985 and 1995, more than 4 million Sub-Saharan Africans died of AIDS. 
Fifteen million more deaths are expected by 2005, with 70% of the world￿s new infections 
and 80% of AIDS deaths occurring in Sub-Saharan Africa alone. In December 1999, 
UNAIDS reported that 8.8% of adults in Sub-Saharan Africa were HIV positive. The UN 
estimates that life expectancy today in Sub-Saharan Africa is 7 years lower than it would 
be in the absence of AIDS. As a result of HIV/AIDS, the population of the 35 Sub-Saharan 
African countries most affected will be 10% lower in 2015 than it otherwise would have 
been, and this despite continuing high fertility in the region.
114 The outcome of this is hard 
to predict, but the ratio of working young adults to dependents will certainly continue to 
dwindle.  
Furthermore, in addition to children and the elderly as dependents, many will be suffering 
the ravages of HIV disease in adulthood.  Heterosexual sex is the dominant means of 
transmission, and the majority of people dying of AIDS are between 20 and 59 years of 
age. In other words, it is a disease that particularly hits those who should be economically 
productive ￿ and threatens not only health, but also the economic stability and potential 
of a country.
115  
Data are far from adequate, but calculations made for Thailand may be instructive for 
understanding the potential economic effect of AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thailand￿s 
ratio of working-age to total population is projected to be 0.70 in 2015.
116 We estimate 
that cumulative AIDS deaths by that year will be about 1 million, a relatively small number 
because risky behaviors have declined as a result of Thailand’s highly successful anti-HIV 
policies. Yet if we simulate cumulative AIDS deaths in the absence of these substantial 
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behavioral improvements, they could be as high as 10 million.  Add to this an estimate of 
the number of children that would not have been born because of these deaths and the 
population could be about 11.6 million smaller than it otherwise would have been.  AIDS 
mortality is disproportionately selective of adults, and we project that of the 10 million 
deaths, 92% or 9.2 million would be among adults.  To this number, we add the .75 
million children these adults would have had, and who would have had the chance to 
reach working age by 2015, and we find that this high risk scenario causes the working 
age population to be smaller by about 9.95 million.
117  This combined effect on the total 
and working age population would result in a decline in the working-age share of the 
population to 0.67. This difference could reduce the growth in per capita GDP by about 
.65 percentage points every year from a projected rate of 3.46 to 2.81.  As a result, the 
level of GDP per capita in 2015 would be $1272 lower than its projected $8500.  At 
Thailand￿s current prevalence rates, still among the highest outside Africa at an adult rate 
of 2.15 percent, the impact on GDP is minimal. Nevertheless, the example demonstrates 
that an unchecked AIDS epidemic ￿ as some African countries are experiencing ￿ can 
have a substantial effect on the growth of income per capita because it is so highly 
concentrated in working-age individuals.  
Ill health undermines a nation at every level, and precipitates and contributes to a vicious 
downward development spiral. Poverty increases susceptibility to illness, itself a prime 
cause of poverty.  High mortality and fertility rates discourage investment in human 
capital: a family cannot afford to spend its limited resources on only one or two children, 
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because their survival rate is relatively low. The reduced incentive to invest in the future 
threatens the economy as well as the political stability of a nation. The UN Security 
Council recently acknowledged the seriousness of the situation when the impact of AIDS 
on Africa￿s peace and security made the agenda on 10 January, 2000: the first time in 
over 4,000 debates that they had tabled a health issue. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan 
has also given the issue prominence, reporting in his millennium statement that ￿the 
pandemic is destroying the economic and social fabric in the countries most affected, 
reversing years of declining death rates and causing dramatic rises in mortality among 
young adults.￿
118  
As long as fertility remains high and families have large numbers of children, Sub-Saharan 
African countries are unlikely to see rising incomes or healthier and better-educated 
workers. Poverty, low educational attainment, and poor health outcomes across much of 
Sub-Saharan Africa will slow fertility decline. Despite these problems, fertility is expected 
to fall from 5.5 to 3.5 in the next 25 years.
119 Still, a potential virtuous spiral has inverted 
and there are no simple solutions for dramatically speeding a rise in incomes. There are 
opportunities to tackle this, however, and perhaps the most promising is that of gender: if 
policy makers can urgently place much more emphasis on educating and empowering 
African women, who represent one of the continent￿s most important economic and social 
engines, they can expect their countries to yield corollary rewards.  
One other possible trend deserves mention: that of substantially increased migration from 
Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe, discussed in some detail in Hatton and Williamson 
(2001)
120 Two forces are working together to impel such migration: (a) wage rates are 
much higher in Europe than Sub-Saharan Africa; and (b) the two regions are at totally 
different, but complementary points in the demographic transition: specifically, Sub-
Saharan Africa has a huge percentage of young people and Europe has a high proportion 
of working-age individuals. The ratio of working-age to non-working-age individuals is 
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reasonably constant over time when the total population of Europe and Africa are 
combined. By contrast, this ratio trends upward in Africa for many decades to come, but 
downward in Europe after 2010. This pattern suggests, at first, that migration of workers 
from Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe could be beneficial for the economies of both regions. 
In practice, of course, European restrictions on immigration are likely to hold down the 
number of Africans who succeed in emigrating to Europe.  Moreover, even if 1 million 
Sub-Saharan working-age immigrants moved to Europe each year from 2000 through 
2024 (which would be on the order of a ten-fold increase over current levels
121), the ratio 
of working-age to non-working-age people in Europe would decrease only a bit more 
slowly than it would otherwise, with the ratio falling from 2.02 in 1995 to 1.97 in 2025 
instead of to 1.85.
122 Of course, such a scenario would have enormous cultural, economic, 
and political effects in Sub-Saharan Africa.  
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
Patterns of fertility Eastern Europe have historically been very different from those in the 
West. Fertility rates fell throughout the 20
th century, with only a slight increase after 
World War II, quickly followed by further declines after abortion was legalized in the 
1950s (seven out of every ten Russian pregnancies end in abortion, although increased 
contraceptive use has recently begun to push abortion rates down).
123 The fertility rate in 
Russia has fallen from 7 children per woman to just 1 in the last 100 years.
124 Latvia, 
Bulgaria, Ukraine, Slovenia, the Russian Federation and Czech Republic all currently figure 
in the ten lowest-fertility countries in the world, with rates well below replacement 
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levels.
125  The ten countries with lowest population growth rates are all found in this 
region, with Estonia, Georgia, Bulgaria and Ukraine seeming likely to remain at very low 
rates for at least the next two decades. 
Rising death rates have sped up the population decline. A high dependence on alcohol has 
contributed to a steep rise in cardiovascular diseases, circulatory problems and violence, 
and the death rate among Russian males in particular has soared. Furthermore, health 
systems in the region have deteriorated, leading to the spread of both old infectious 
diseases like tuberculosis, and new ones like HIV/AIDS. Reported HIV infection rates in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union rose by 67% between the end of 1999 and 
the end of 2000, with the number of new infections in the Russian Federation in 2000 
alone almost double the total number reported in the previous 12 years.
126  
Fertility rates in the region are likely to begin to rise again by 2025, but total population 
sizes will continue to fall for the next 50 years. Russia￿s population will fall from 145 
million today to 104 million in 2050, for example, and Ukraine￿s will drop from 50 million 
to 30 million over the same period. The continuous decline in fertility and the rise in death 
rates have meant that Eastern Europe, and Russia in particular, have experienced very 
different demographic changes from those of other world regions. In the next 50 years 
Russia will see a growth in its elderly population and a shrinkage in its working-age and 
youth population. Although countries such as Japan will see the same pattern, they have 
had the benefit of a baby boom generation helping to boost the economy and make it 
better able to cope with an increased elderly cohort. The former Soviet Union has had no 
such dividend. Moreover, health systems in the region are struggling to keep up with the 
illnesses affecting the population today, and as that population ages, the pressure will be 
even greater. 
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Policy issues in this region are complex in the light of demography. The first priority must 
be health. The rise in death rates needs to be reversed and governments should take 
urgent action to prevent the spread of HIV/AIDS via both education and condom 
distribution. Vulnerable groups, such as drug users and sex workers, should be targeted, 
with business encouraged to play a role in prevention efforts. As several companies in 
Africa and Thailand have shown, the private sector can play a useful role in AIDS efforts, 
bringing its skills to the problem and helping to ease the burden on health systems.
127 
In short, and in the absence of any demographic dividend to benefit from, the region is 
likely to be best served by focusing on health, welfare and the economy as a means of 
reaching long-term demographic stability and positioning itself to cope with an aging 
society.  
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Chapter 4  The Importance of the Policy Environment  
As the case studies show, several key policy variables influence nations’ abilities to realize 
their ￿demographic dividend.￿  This chapter explores several of these:  health policies to 
improve public health and access to care; family planning and related reproductive health 
policies to help families achieve their desired size; education policies to increase access to 
schooling; and economic policies that promote labor-market flexibility, openness to trade, 
adequate credit and savings.  
A. HEALTH EQUALS WEALTH 
Improvements in public health are at the heart of the demographic transition.  Decreased 
infant and child mortality, combined with increased life expectancy and finally a fall in 
fertility, brought about by improved sanitation, immunization programs, DDT, antibiotics 
and contraceptives, initiate the declines in mortality that lead to declines in fertility, which 
together cause changes in the age distribution and size of a population.  
The health story does not end there, however.  In recent years, evidence is mounting that 
health is also a key determinant of economic performance, counter to the frequently 
made assumption that causation runs only from wealth to health.
128  The WHO 
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health has found ￿substantial evidence showing that 
improved health of the population contributes to higher economic growth and poverty 
alleviation.￿
129  On the other hand, these findings are not clearly robust to the introduction 
of country fixed effects, which potentially suggests that the significant life expectancy 
coefficients are picking up more than just health effects on economic growth (i.e., they 
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may be reflecting unobserved influences on growth  that are correlated with life 
expectancy).
130 
If a country is to promote the demographic transition and take advantage of the 
demographic dividend, five health policies should be prioritized:   
-  First, ensuring that infants receive effective medical care is of paramount 
importance, as a high degree of certainty about a child￿s chances of survival is vital 
to the completion of the demographic transition. Such certainty precludes the need 
to have more offspring and will mean that investment in education is concentrated 
in fewer children.  
-  Second, the health of women is critical for two main reasons.  Women￿s access to 
reproductive health services is important for achieving desired family sizes.  
Women are also essential conduits of knowledge about health: A healthier woman 
will likely improve the health of her family.   
-  Third, children need to have adequate support for their health needs in order to 
ensure they maximize their opportunities in the education system, where poor 
health often contributes to educational under-achievement.
131   
-  Fourth, as the baby boom generation enters the workforce, a proportion of the 
prosperity they generate will have to be channeled back into policies that improve 
their health.  This is not an area where the market will necessarily suffice, as 
market failures in the public health area are pervasive, and the institutions and 
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technologies that support health must instead be generated through efforts by the 
state, civil society, and families.
132   
-  Fifth, policies to improve health can prove a powerful weapon against social 
exclusion, which lessens or eliminates the contribution that certain groups make to 
the development of a society and to its positive demographic transition.  Ill health 
causes poverty and it keeps people in poverty, both at a family and a national 
level. The World Bank has reported that when households become poorer, the 
most common reason is illness, injury, or death.
133   
Implementation of policies to improve health is a complex process, with a range of 
medical, public health, and non-health interventions to choose from.  Medical 
interventions, such as vaccines and drugs, primary health care centers, and clinics, offer 
the opportunity for high-profile, cost-effective action against clearly identified health 
problems. So called ￿vertical￿ interventions, such as vaccination campaigns, work best 
when they are conducted on a massive scale and where near-universal take-up multiplies 
the benefit.  However, vertical interventions are currently poorly funded, and there is an 
overwhelming need for increased funding at an international level both for the 
development of new vaccines and cures, and for more effective delivery. This 
international public good is not being delivered by the market, with only 11 of 1223 new 
compounds launched on the market between 1975 and 1997 designed to tackle tropical 
diseases. Potential solutions include governments receiving more assistance from 
international organizations such as the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization, or 
working more constructively with the private sector to fill the breach.
134  
Non-medical interventions are aimed at working more broadly to strengthen health 
systems. Priorities include the need to develop better data for decision-making and to use 
these data to set priorities for decision-making. Ministries should aim to develop a new 
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role that emphasizes facilitation, sponsorship of innovation, finance, and supervisory 
capabilities, beyond the traditional emphasis on delivery. Partnerships between the public 
sector, civil society, and the private sector have the potential to be fruitful, but these 
partnerships need leadership if they are to develop.
135   
Health outcomes can also be improved by non-health policies and by exploiting positive 
feedback between different policy areas.  ￿Virtuous spirals￿ are possible as, for example, 
educated people seek better health, while healthy people are more receptive consumers 
of education.  
B. POPULATION POLICY AND THE FAMILY 
Population policy has a direct impact on the speed, timing, and completion of the 
demographic transition, with corresponding effects on the amplitude of the demographic 
bulge. Although unproven, it is also plausible that a sharper transition has greater 
potential to lift an economy out of a poverty trap and onto a sustainable growth 
trajectory. This could have important policy implications, highlighting, for example, family 
planning as an instrument of economic growth above and beyond its contribution to 
reproductive health.  
The Population Council estimates that at least 120 million women in developing countries 
have an unmet need for contraception, while the United Nations Population Fund 
estimates that half of the world￿s 175 million pregnancies a year are unwanted or 
mistimed.
136  In developing countries, excluding China, approximately one-fourth of all 
births are unwanted.
137 Research suggests that if women were to reach (but not exceed) 
their desired family size, this would achieve targets for fertility reduction in 13 out of 17 
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countries whose governments have quantitative targets to reduce fertility.
138 Lack of 
knowledge about contraceptive methods, concern about possible side effects, and the 
possibility of disapproval from partners and other members of the community, have been 
identified as key factors limiting access.
139  The impact of family planning programs on 
fertility rates has been highly significant, exceeding the impact of socioeconomic factors 
such as rising income. It has been estimated that programs have reduced fertility by 
between 1 and 1.5 births per woman and accounted for roughly 40 percent of the decline 
in fertility in the 1960s, 70s and 80s.
 140  However, not all programs are equally effective.  
The most successful take advantage of latent demand for contraception and focus on 
lowering barriers to the take-up of services. This requires an emphasis on convenience, 
broad choice, and measures like social marketing that gradually overcome institutional 
resistance to women using contraception.
141  
Without trying to dictate the number of children couples may or should have, 
governments can at least put in place policies to facilitate family planning and respond to 
demand. Political support can help facilitate institutional change and encourage new forms 
of behavior.  It is also vital for ensuring proper financing, especially in the critical phase 
where pilot programs are built on to provide near-universal coverage.  As the use of 
contraception becomes institutionalized, however, governments may be able to withdraw, 
at least partially, from provision and financing, as other actors take responsibility for 
meeting a constant and established demand. Donor support is also important, through 
establishing an international climate that encourages the research, development, and roll-
out of contraceptive services; by sponsoring a political dialogue to help build a consensus 
about the need for effective population policy; and by supporting governments as they 
develop national programs. Donors can also help promote delivery standards, provide 
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training at all levels, and help evaluate the comparative success ￿ or otherwise ￿ of 
national programs.
142 
Other policies can have a powerful influence on reproductive behavior and health.  
Education is a vital influence on family size ￿ more-educated parents face higher 
opportunity costs as their families grow, and are also likely to wish to educate their 
children to a high standard. Policies to improve the socio-economic position of women will 
have an impact on fertility similar to that of increasing the quantity and quality of 
education.  Anti-discrimination regulation in the workplace and credit market, for example, 
will help improve women￿s opportunities for employment and raise opportunity costs of 
having children.  As women￿s standing increases within a household, they are also more 
likely to drive institutional and cultural change, which will also lead to smaller families and 
improved opportunities for children. 
The effect of the demographic transition on women is part of a more general impact on 
family structures and gender relations.  Smaller families, increased empowerment of 
women, and urbanization are also associated with rising divorce rates. Family breakdown 
can have catastrophic social effects. Single-parent families and single-person households 
have become more common across the developed world, with approximately half of 
American marriages now ending in divorce and the marriage rate in Sweden now only 3.6 
per 1000 inhabitants
143 (less than half the US rate). Children in single-parent families are 
more likely to be living in poverty than those from two-parent families. Additionally, 
working mothers will find child care prohibitively expensive without the support of 
extended families. Social exclusion can be the result. 
Developing country policymakers in some countries may therefore be well advised to 
anticipate the time when their demographic transition has matured. They can expect 
declining or low and stable fertility rates; declining rates of marriage; high but stable 
divorce rates; increased cohabitation, lone parenting, and out-of-wedlock childbearing; 
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and medium to high rates of female labor force participation.  By taking measures at this 
stage to support the development of a ￿new￿ family, they can attempt to leapfrog many 
of the problems that developed countries have faced.  
C. POLICIES FOR LABOR AND FINANCIAL MARKETS, AND HUMAN CAPITAL 
Having a larger, healthier and better-educated workforce will only bear economic fruit if 
the extra workers can find jobs.  Open economies, flexible labor forces, and modern 
institutions that can gain the confidence of the population and markets alike may help 
countries to reap the potential benefit created by their demographic transition.  
Openness to trade can be a key driver of economic growth, helping to significantly boost 
the benefits a country receives from the demographic transition.
144  If Latin America￿s 
economy had been as open, as measured by the Sachs-Warner index, as East Asia￿s 
between 1965-1990, it is estimated that per capita income would have reached US$4,000 
instead of US$2,950, and poverty would have been substantially lower.
145  Access to world 
markets, backed up by export promotion, is thought by many to be an effective way to 
find sufficient demand for a nation￿s output. 
146. However, this view has been contested 
on both conceptual and empirical grounds. 
147  
A healthy degree of flexibility in labor markets is also vital if a country is to accommodate 
a burgeoning working-age population. Flexibility means that employers are able to rapidly 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
143 The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order, Francis Fukuyama, The Free 
Press, 1999 
144 Barro, R. 1997. The Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross Country Empirical Study. Cambridge:  
MIT Press; Bloom, D. and Sachs, J. 1998. ￿Geography, demography, and economic growth in Africa￿, 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2, 207￿73 
145 Bloom, D., Canning, D., Evans, D., Graham, B., Lynch, P., and Murphy, E. Population Change and Human 
Development in Latin America. In Inter-American Development Bank. 1999-2000 Report on Economic and 
Social Progress in Latin America 
146 Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner, 1995. "Economic Reform and the Process of Global Integration," 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Vol 1: 1-118. 
147 See, for example, Dani Rodrik ("Trading in Illusions," Foreign Policy, March-April 2001), who concludes, 
"Neither economic theory nor empirical evidence guarantees that deep trade liberalization will deliver higher 
economic growth. Economic openness and all its accouterments do not deserve the priority they typically 
receive in the development strategies pushed by leading multilateral organizations." For another provocative   56
expand and contract their businesses, to shift workers from one area of the business to 
another, and to raise and lower pay more easily. Flexibility also means a workforce that is 
able to adapt its working patterns as the business environment shifts.  Flexibility can be 
difficult to ￿sell￿ to a workforce, as employers are commonly thought to reap the benefits 
while employees bear the costs, although the provision of adequate safety nets and 
generous re-training programs can help persuade workers to become less risk-averse.
148 
Although recent history shows that designing and implementing effective programs along 
these lines is a challenging task in low- and middle-income countries, the incentives for 
proceeding in this direction are substantial. Many wealth industrial countries have 
successful programs that provide a good starting point for thinking both conventionally 
and imaginatively along these lines. In addition, recent research suggests that the 
presence of social protection programs is not closely correlated with different measures of 
labor market flexibility.
149  
Minimum wage policy should be especially carefully designed. If wage levels are set (and 
enforced) above market rates, they effectively push low-skilled workers out of the formal 
economy into the informal economy.  They also make legitimate companies less able to 
compete in foreign markets. In Brazil for instance, the minimum wage stood at 100 reales 
per month in May 1995, a level that exceeded actual earnings of almost 20 percent of 
workers. National and subnational governments may be able to create a sustainable 
balance by actively involving both workers and employers in discussions about minimum 
wage levels. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
critique, see Arthur MacEwan, Neoliberalism or Democracy?: Economic Strategy, Markets, and Alternatives 
for the 21st Century. Zed Books, 2001. 
148 As a recent UNCTAD/UNDP paper on Jamaica has noted: ￿Policy-makers need to tread a particularly 
complex path as they try to deliver growth, improve Jamaica￿s competitiveness, help displaced workers find 
new jobs in more productive sectors and provide some kind of security for those who lose out.￿ David E 
Bloom, Ajay S Mahal, Damien King, Fiorina Mugione, Aldrie Henry-Lee, Dillon Alleyne, Philip Castillo and 
River Path Associates (2001): ￿Jamaica: Globalisation, Liberalization and Sustainable Human Development￿ 
UNCTAD/UNDP Programme on Globalisation, Liberalization and Sustainable Human Development. February 
2001: 42 
149 Rebecca M. Blank, ed., Social Protection Versus Economic Flexibility: Is There a Trade-off? University of 
Chicago Press. Chicago. 1994.   57
Absorbing the baby boom generation into productive employment is more than just a 
matter of labor market flexibility.  Any expanding economic enterprise (from small 
business to large country) is hungry for capital.  Investment can come from savings ￿ by 
government, business, or private individuals ￿ or from overseas development assistance 
or foreign direct investment.  Private household savings are one of the most powerful 
ways of financing growth, as the East Asian experience has shown. Individual savings are, 
in turn, dependent on demography and longevity.  People save at different points in their 
lives, and they save for different purposes, most notably, their retirement. 
Encouraging private savings and efficiently allocating them to investment requires reform 
of macroeconomic policy and financial institutions. Governance affects how much a 
country saves and whether those savings are productively invested.  Latin America 
provides an example of a region where savings are low, while East Asia￿s much higher 
savings rates contributed substantially to its development.  The demographic transition 
can encourage people to save ￿ but only if saving seems relatively safe and relatively 
profitable.  In order to promote saving, governments must attempt to provide price 
stability, as incentives to save are higher in environments with low inflation, and 
encourage competition, transparency and efficiency in the financial institutions.  
When credit is scarce, the poor generally lose out more than others. However, the past 
two decades have seen the development of successful new models of microfinance by the 
private sector, NGOs, and the state.  These have demonstrated the power of widespread 
credit in improving the lives of people in rural areas.  Targeting low-income households, 
and giving credit that is often collateral-free and at significantly lower interest rates than 
those in the informal credit market, these institutions help microenterprises develop in 
rural areas and provide income-generation opportunities to poorer segments of the rural 
population.  The work of Bangladeshi economist Professor Muhammad Yunus, and the 
Grameen Bank which he set up, have more than demonstrated the value of microcredit. 
Beginning with US$50 and 20 borrowers, Grameen expanded rapidly: it now lends over 
US$400 million annually to a membership base of over 2 million.  The Grameen Bank 
concentrates on lending to women ￿ who now make up 94 per cent of its clientele.  So   58
far, almost half a million houses have been built as a result of its efforts. Meanwhile, the 
Grameen Bank￿s repayment rate of over 98 per cent would be the envy of all mainstream 
banks ￿ and persuasively refutes the argument that the poor are inherently high-risk 
borrowers. Professor Yunus has also used the Grameen Bank to develop a range of social 
initiatives, including housing, sanitation, and education programs.
150 
As countries pass through the demographic transition, they have the opportunity to 
examine past errors and learn from them.  Many developing countries have been tempted 
to copy institutions and practices that evolved in the industrialized countries. Yet, in the 
current period of global transition, this may be a misguided strategy.  Not only do 
industrialized countries operate in mature economies that have developed over long 
periods, but many of them are also finding that they, too, need to re-invent their 
institutional base, often rooted in the 19th century, for the challenge of the 21st. There is 
an interesting analogy with technological progress.  No one suggests that developing 
countries should install analog telephone systems just because developed countries have 
these legacies.  Instead, developing countries are free to leapfrog over the old and adopt 
new technologies more suited to the modern world.   
Another advantage for developing countries lies in the very youth of the people striving to 
deliver the demographic dividend and the opportunity to invest in positioning them for 
future economic challenges. Much better positioned by their recent education and long 
work horizon to adapt to new and changing technology, they can bring their creativity and 
energy to bear in order to use it advantageously. Using the youthful population to make 
progress in the knowledge economy is a formidable ￿ but not insuperable ￿ task. It will 
require a willingness to invest in education at all levels, including higher education, and to 
attempt to offer people ￿education for life￿, enabling them to retrain for fast-moving labor 
markets.  Policymakers can use the demographic dividend to begin to shift resources 
towards broadening access to more advanced forms of education. As fertility rates fall, 
demand for primary education will drop and, over time, this effect will be repeated at 
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secondary level. However, demand for higher education will simultaneously be rising (at 
least for a period of time), as those leaving secondary education consider attempting to 
gain more advanced qualifications.
151 
Collectively, then, there are major problems to address, and no ready-made regulatory 
environment of proven success across many countries with which to address them.  Yet 
some lessons can be learned from the past, and developing country policy-makers have 
the opportunity to build on these.  By tapping into the energy and initiative of their baby 
boomers, they can promote the demographic dividend of economic growth. But, in order 
to avoid increasing social exclusion and unrest, they must do so in a way that protects 
and creates opportunities for the poor during a time of major economic transition.  The 
economic and political challenge is to devise policies and programs in both the public and 
private arenas that judiciously blend social protection and economic flexibility.  The long-
run advantages of such a blend need to be balanced against concerns about possible 
short-run adjustment costs.  
D. POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE: PLANNING FOR AN OLDER POPULATION 
The powerful consequences of the demographic transition have the benefit of being 
persistent and predictable. Demography provides a crystal ball that allows a policymaker 
to make policies for tomorrow￿s world, not yesterday￿s. 
In some regions of the world, planning now for rising numbers of old people is essential.  
As populations get older, and older people remain healthier, countries face a new set of 
challenges. People over 65 can expect another 15 years of healthy life. Over time, these 
will be increasingly healthy years. Retirement in most countries is currently between 60 
and 65. Increased life expectancy and an aging population are the final iterations of the 
demographic transition. With the changing structures of families, older people can easily 
become more isolated, financially as well as emotionally. Pension systems that were 
designed to support a small older population will come under increasing strain. Developed 
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countries are likely to feel this pressure first. Spending on pensions could push Japan￿s 
budget deficit up to 20 percent of GDP by 2030, as the country becomes the oldest in the 
world.
152  Either pension contributions will have to increase to 35% of salaries, or the level 
of pension benefits will have to decrease. Japan’s pension system is particularly at risk 
because of the rapidity of its population aging. 
Pension reform in developing countries is therefore a high priority.  Pay-as-you-go 
pensions systems, where pensions are funded from current government revenues, are 
likely to become increasingly difficult to sustain, and the demographic transition should 
hasten the worldwide trend towards fully-funded pensions. In a fully-funded system, 
individuals save for their own retirement and, since the vast majority contain some 
element of compulsion, increase levels of national savings. Fully-funded systems come 
with their own problems, of course; in particular, they require countries to have a financial 
system developed enough to provide sufficient high-quality savings vehicles, and a 
government to have the ability to prudently regulate the financial institutions that will 
manage these funds.  However, pioneering schemes, such as those found in Latin 
America, have provoked much debate and opened up a series of new methods of pension 
provision.
153 It is worth noting that pension reform is a particularly important issue for 
women, who live significantly longer lives than men in most countries in the world. 
Women typically outnumber men at older ages, and the difference is large among the 
oldest old. At ages 60 or older, there were an estimated 81 men for every 100 women 
globally in 2000, and at ages 80 or older there were only 53 men for every 100 women. 
Female advantage in life expectancy at birth is currently around 3 years in developing 
countries, but may eventually reach the average difference of 8 years in developed 
regions. 
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As the demographic transition progresses, financing for health care becomes even more 
important, with countries undergoing an epidemiological transition where non-
communicable diseases (such as diabetes, heart disease, and cancer) become 
predominant.  These changes lead to sizable increases in health care expenditures.  Data 
from the world￿s wealthy industrial countries reveal that health care expenditures per 
capita are roughly three times higher for the elderly than for the non-elderly.  Elder care 
will be borne increasingly by institutions other than the family, most likely nursing homes.  
Again, many developing countries will need to move towards systems that link an 
individual’s benefits to his/her contributions and thus limit inequitable intergenerational 
transfers. Peru, for example, has created legislation to allow workers to choose between 
the traditional social insurance system and private insurance.   
Public-private partnerships are likely to be needed in many areas of social policy, as 
governments alone will be unable to cope with vast demographic changes, and markets 
alone will leave some areas unattended.  Such partnerships provide innovative ways for 
the public and private sector to share costs and administrative duties associated with the 
provision of social services.  In the developed world, it is interesting to note how 
government is under pressure to act in a more business-like fashion, while business 
(especially large corporations) is facing increasing demands to accept more social 
responsibility. While government must become more efficient trustees of the taxpayers’ 
money, business needs to explore the effects on its bottom line of a whole range of 
factors ￿ from better educated workers to improved environmental performance.
154 
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Chapter 5  Conclusions 
Population neutralism, which has focused on the effects of population growth, has 
encouraged economists to neglect demography when considering the future prosperity 
and development of the world￿s countries. A focus on population structure, however, 
offers policymakers a vital tool as they plan for and manage the changes their countries 
face. 
For developing countries, the demographic transition offers significant opportunities, but 
opportunities that are unlikely to recur. They must therefore act soon to implement the 
policy mix required to accelerate the demographic transition and make its effects more 
pronounced. As mortality declines, policies to facilitate family planning and push down 
fertility rates should follow. Such measures will have broader collateral impacts than just 
reducing fertility ￿ women will have more time to work and their health will be improved.  
A focus on education at all levels will prepare the baby boom generation for its future 
incorporation into the workforce. Practical, relevant curricula (taking into account the 
importance of changing technology as well as, for example, the health problems that 
beset societies) can give developing countries a better chance of catching up to some of 
the more advanced societies, many of whose education systems have problems of their 
own. 
As they begin to realize their demographic dividend, countries will be able to continue to 
invest in the development process. In principle, openness to trade combined with flexible 
labor markets will create work opportunities for the enlarged working-age cohort. 
Encouraging savings and investment via reform of financial institutions and targeting the 
poor with microfinance programs will give countries the resources to prepare for the 
future, when the boom generation passes out of the workforce. 
A failure to act on these issues could have a damaging effect on future prospects, as 
unemployment rises, the social fabric crumbles, and rising numbers of old people begin to 
overwhelm available resources. Reform will be needed, and necessary reform will   63
inevitably be controversial.  The demographic transition changes society profoundly and 
fundamentally influences family structure, the status of women and children, and the way 
people work. Policymakers must therefore work hard to explain the changes that are 
happening and articulate the policies that are needed to take full advantage of them.  
Demography provides a clear narrative within which policies can be framed and a 
powerful lens through which priorities can be identified.  Embracing and understanding 
demographic challenges must therefore be a priority for all governments, as they build the 
broad partnerships that will be necessary to secure change. 
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1 billion in 1804 
2 billion in 1927 (123 years later) 
3 billion in 1960 (33 years later) 
4 billion in 1974 (14 years later) 
5 billion in 1987 (13 years later) 
6 billion in 1999 (12 years later) 
7 billion in 2012 (13 years later) 
8 billion in 2026 (14 years later) 
9 billion in 2043 (17 years later) 
Source: Population Division, Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs, UN Secretariat. Population Newsletter No 66, December 1998; 
and United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision 
 Table 2 
Total Population in 2001, by Region, Sub-Region, and Country 
(thousands) 
 




WORLD 6,134,135   
More developed regions
1 1,193,861  19.5% 
Less developed regions
2 4,940,274  80.5% 
Least developed countries
3 674,954  11.0% 
AFRICA 812,603  13.2% 
Eastern Africa  256,673  4.2% 
Burundi 6,502   
Comoros 727   
Djibouti 644   
Eritrea 3,816   
Ethiopia 64,459   
Kenya 31,293   
Madagascar 16,437   
Malawi 11,572   
Mauritius 1,171   
Mozambique 18,644   
RØunion 732   
Rwanda 7,949   
Seychelles 81   
Somalia 9,157   
Uganda 24,023   
United Republic of Tanzania  35,965   
Zambia 10,649   
Zimbabwe 12,852   
Middle Africa  98,151  1.6% 
Angola 13,527   
Cameroon 15,203   
Central African Republic  3,782   
Chad 8,135   
Congo 3,110   
Democratic Republic of the Congo  52,522   
Equatorial Guinea  470   
Gabon 1,262   
Sao Tome and Principe  140   
                                           
1 United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision defines "more developed regions" as "all 
regions of Europe plus  Northern America, Australia/New Zealand and Japan." 
2 United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision defines "less developed regions" as "all 
regions of Africa, Asia (excluding Japan), Latin America and the Caribbean plus Melanesia, Micronesia and 
Polynesia." 
3 United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision follows the United Nations General 
Assembly’s 1998 definition of "least developed countries" as these 48 countries: Afghanistan, Angola, 
Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Comoros, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, 
Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa, Sªo TomØ and Pr￿ncipe, 
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, Sudan, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, 
Yemen and Zambia. These countries  are also included in the less developed regions, except where otherwise 




Northern Africa  177,391  2.9% 
Algeria 30,841   
Egypt 69,080   
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya  5,408   
Morocco 30,430   
Sudan 31,809   
Tunisia 9,562   
Western Sahara  260   
Southern Africa  50,129  0.8% 
Botswana 1,554   
Lesotho 2,057   
Namibia 1,788   
South Africa  43,792   
Swaziland 938   
Western Africa  230,259  3.8% 
Benin 6,446   
Burkina Faso  11,856   
Cape Verde  437   
C￿te d’Ivoire  16,349   
Gambia 1,337   
Ghana 19,734   
Guinea 8,274   
Guinea Bissau  1,227   
Liberia 3,108   
Mali 11,677   
Mauritania 2,747   
Niger 11,227   
Nigeria 116,929   
Saint Helena  6   
Senegal 9,662   
Sierra Leone  4,587   
Togo 4,657   
ASIA 3,720,705  60.7% 
Eastern Asia  1,491,772  24.3% 
China 1,284,972   
China, Hong Kong SAR  6,961   
China, Macao SAR  449   
Dem. People’s Republic of Korea  22,428   
Japan 127,335   
Mongolia 2,559   
Republic of Korea  47,069   
South-central Asia  1,506,727  24.6% 
Afghanistan 22,474   
Bangladesh 140,369   
Bhutan 2,141   
India 1,025,096   
Iran (Islamic Republic of)  71,369   
Kazakhstan 16,095   
Kyrgyzstan 4,986   
Maldives 300   
Nepal 23,593   
Pakistan 144,971   
Sri Lanka  19,104   
Tajikistan 6,135   
Turkmenistan 4,835   




South-eastern Asia  529,762  8.6% 
Brunei Darussalam  335   
Cambodia 13,441   
East Timor  750   
Indonesia 214,840   
Lao People’s Democratic Republic  5,403   
Malaysia 22,633   
Myanmar 48,364   
Philippines 77,131   
Singapore 4,108   
Thailand 63,584   
Viet Nam  79,175   
Western Asia  192,445  3.1% 
Armenia 3,788   
Azerbaijan 8,096   
Bahrain 652   
Cyprus 790   
Georgia 5,239   
Iraq 23,584   
Israel 6,172   
Jordan 5,051   
Kuwait 1,971   
Lebanon 3,556   
Occupied Palestinian Territory  3,311   
Oman 2,622   
Qatar 575   
Saudi Arabia  21,028   
Syrian Arab Republic  16,610   
Turkey 67,632   
United Arab Emirates  2,654   
Yemen 19,114   
EUROPE 726,312  11.8% 
Eastern Europe  302,619  4.9% 
Belarus 10,147   
Bulgaria 7,867   
Czech Republic  10,260   
Hungary 9,917   
Poland 38,577   
Republic of Moldova  4,285   
Romania 22,388   
Russian Federation  144,664   
Slovakia 5,403   
Ukraine 49,112   
Northern Europe  95,236  1.6% 
Channel Islands  145   
Denmark 5,333   
Estonia 1,377   
Faeroe Islands  47   
Finland 5,178   
Iceland 281   
Ireland 3,841   
Isle of Man  76   
Latvia 2,406   
Lithuania 3,689   
Norway 4,488   
Sweden 8,833   




Southern Europe  145,050  2.4% 
Albania 3,145   
Andorra 90   
Bosnia and Herzegovina  4,067   
Croatia 4,655   
Gibraltar 27   
Greece 10,623   
Holy See  1   
Italy 57,503   
Malta 392   
Portugal 10,033   
San Marino  27   
Slovenia 1,985   
Spain 39,921   
TFYR Macedonia  2,044   
Yugoslavia 10,538   
Western Europe  183,407  3.0% 
Austria 8,075   
Belgium 10,264   
France 59,453   
Germany 82,007   
Liechtenstein 33   
Luxembourg 442   
Monaco 34   
Netherlands 15,930   
Switzerland 7,170   
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  526,533  8.6% 
Caribbean 38,329  0.6% 
Anguilla 12   
Antigua and Barbuda  65   
Aruba 104   
Bahamas 308   
Barbados 268   
British Virgin Islands  24   
Cayman Islands  40   
Cuba 11,237   
Dominica 71   
Dominican Republic  8,507   
Grenada 94   
Guadeloupe 431   
Haiti 8,270   
Jamaica 2,598   
Martinique 386   
Montserrat 3   
Netherlands Antilles  217   
Puerto Rico  3,952   
Saint Kitts and Nevis  38   
Saint Lucia  149   
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines  114   
Trinidad and Tobago  1,300   
Turks and Caicos Islands  17   
United States Virgin Islands  122   
Central America  137,480  2.2% 
Belize 231   
Costa Rica  4,112   
El Salvador  6,400   
Guatemala 11,687   
Honduras 6,575   
Mexico 100,368   
Nicaragua 5,208   




South America  350,724  5.7% 
Argentina 37,488   
Bolivia 8,516   
Brazil 172,559   
Chile 15,402   
Colombia 42,803   
Ecuador 12,880   
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)  2   
French Guiana  170   
Guyana 763   
Paraguay 5,636   
Peru 26,093   
Suriname 419   
Uruguay 3,361   
Venezuela 24,632   
NORTHERN AMERICA  317,068  5.2% 
Bermuda 63   
Canada 31,015   
Greenland 56   
Saint Pierre et Miquelon  7   
United States of America  285,926   
OCEANIA 30,915  0.5% 
Australia/New Zealand  23,146  0.4% 
Australia 19,338   
New Zealand  3,808   
Melanesia 6,627  0.1% 
Fiji 823   
New Caledonia  220   
Papua New Guinea  4,920   
Solomon Islands  463   
Vanuatu 202   
Micronesia 528  0.0% 
Guam 158   
Kiribati 84   
Marshall Islands  52   
Micronesia (Federated States of)  126   
Nauru 13   
Northern Mariana Islands  76   
Palau 20   
Polynesia 613  0.0% 
American Samoa  70   
Cook Islands  20   
French Polynesia  237   
Niue 2   
Pitcairn 0   
Samoa 159   
Tokelau 1   
Tonga 99   
Tuvalu 10   
Wallis and Futuna Islands  15   
Less developed regions excluding China  3,647,893  59.5% 
Less developed regions excluding the 
least developed countries  4,265,320 69.5% 
Sub-Saharan Africa  667,022  10.9% 
    
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision 
 Table 3 
Annual Population Growth Rates 


































ASIA  2.06 2.51 1.44 1.30 1.64 0.69 0.72 0.57 1.02 
Eastern Asia  1.75 2.43 0.66 0.74 0.94 0.32 0.18 -0.36 1.24 
South-central Asia  2.28 2.49 2.02 1.69 2.17 0.94 1.00 1.11 0.77 
South-eastern Asia  2.26 2.66 1.74 1.43 2.00 0.43 0.80 0.68 1.04 
Western Asia  2.76 3.06 2.39 2.17 2.51 1.65 1.58 1.68 1.42 
 
 Table 4 
Annual Population Growth Rates, Percent 
 
 





















WORLD  1.84 2.14 1.39 1.27 1.54 0.81 
More developed regions  0.69 0.90 0.29 0.22 0.24 0.19 
Less developed regions  2.23 2.63 1.70 1.52 1.87 0.94 
Least developed countries  2.52 2.50 2.55 2.54 2.78 2.26 
Less developed regions excluding China  2.39 2.63 2.07 1.78 2.20 1.14 
Less developed regions excl the least dev countries  2.19 2.65 1.57 1.36 1.75 0.67 
Sub-Saharan Africa  2.82 2.74 2.91 2.51 2.73 2.26 
AFRICA  2.77 2.77 2.77 2.36 2.67 1.99 
Eastern Africa  2.92 2.86 2.98 2.50 2.71 2.26 
Middle Africa  2.78 2.48 3.11 3.05 3.06 3.04 
Northern Africa  2.57 2.87 2.22 1.76 2.46 0.65 
Southern Africa  2.48 2.75 2.14 0.90 1.25 0.35 
Western Africa  2.83 2.70 2.98 2.66 2.97 2.30 
ASIA  2.06 2.51 1.44 1.30 1.64 0.69 
Eastern Asia  1.75 2.43 0.66 0.74 0.94 0.32 
South-central Asia  2.28 2.49 2.02 1.69 2.17 0.94 
South-eastern Asia  2.26 2.66 1.74 1.43 2.00 0.43 
Western Asia  2.76 3.06 2.39 2.17 2.51 1.65 
EUROPE  0.52 0.69 0.20 -0.10 0.00 -0.30 
Eastern Europe  0.61 0.76 0.33 -0.40  -0.09 -1.07 
Northern Europe  0.34 0.38 0.27 0.16 0.22 0.06 
Southern Europe  0.60 0.79 0.22 -0.02  -0.06 0.07 
Western Europe  0.38 0.64 -0.10 0.19 0.08 0.41 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN  2.28 2.74 1.71 1.44 1.91 0.65 
Caribbean  1.62 2.06 1.02 1.00 1.31 0.47 
Central America  2.67 3.19 2.08 1.67 2.27 0.72 
South America  2.23 2.67 1.64 1.41 1.85 0.64 
NORTHERN AMERICA  1.01 1.40 0.37 0.93 0.99 0.79 
OCEANIA  1.66 1.96 1.17 1.30 1.35 1.20 
Australia/New Zealand  1.48 1.82 0.88 1.01 1.02 1.01 
Melanesia  2.38 2.57 2.15 2.21 2.57 1.69 
Micronesia  2.57 2.98 2.05 2.18 2.21 2.14 
Polynesia  1.69 2.36 0.90 1.18 1.55 0.60 
 
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision Figure 1 
 




































Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision.  
 
Note: The UN defines "Least Developed Nations" to be a subset of "Less Developed Nations." By 
contrast, these charts completely separate the two categories, removing the "least developed" 
nations from the "less developed." Figure 2 
 
 
Source: David E Bloom (2000): Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles. Prepared for 
the Video Conference on 17 May 2000 between the American University in Cairo and the World 
Bank Institute, Washington DC. 
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Life cycle income and consumption









 Figure 6 
 
 


















































Source: Population Reference Bureau (2001). Human Population: Fundamentals of Growth, Population 
Growth and Distribution. Available at 
http://www.prb.org/Content/NavigationMenu/PRB/Educators/Human_Population/Population_Growth/Population_Growth.htm 



















Africa Asia Europe Lat Am & Carib US & Canada Oceania
Source: United Nations, World Population




























































More Developed Countries Less Developed Countries World
Source:  UN, World Population 
Prospects 1950-2050, 2000 
Revision
Post-2000 data are projections.
 
 Figure 10 















































More Developed Countries Less Developed Countries World
Source:  UN, World 
Population Prospects: The 
2000 Revision















 Figure 12 
Population Growth Rate Over the Course of the Demographic Transition 
























































Population by Age Group and Year, Less Developed Regions
Source: UN, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision  

















































Population by Age Group and Year, East Asia





















































Population by Age Group and Year, Ireland
Source: UN, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision  

















































Population by Age Group and Year, Sub-Saharan Africa
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 Figure 18  
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Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects: The 2000 Revision 
 